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Abstract 
 
Today’s smart phones are used for wider range of activities. This 
extended range of functionalities has also seen the infi ltration of  new 
security threats. Android has been the favorite target of cyber criminals. 
The malicious parties are using highly stealthy techniques to perform the 
targeted operations, which are hard to detect by the conventional 
signature and behaviour based approaches. Additionally, the limited 
resources of mobile device are inadequate to perform the extensive 
malware detection tasks. Impulsively emerging Android malware merit a 
robust and effective malware detection solution. 
In this thesis, we present the PIndroid ― a novel Permissions and 
Intents based framework for identifying Android malware apps. To the 
best of author’s knowledge, PIndroid is the first solution that uses a 
combination of permissions and intents supplemented with ensemble 
methods for malware detection. It overcomes the drawbacks of some of 
the existing malware detection methods. Our goal is to provide mobile 
users with an effective malware detection and prevention solution keeping 
in view the limited resources of mobile devices and versatility of  malware 
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behavior. Our detection engine classifies the apps against certain 
distinguishing combinations of permissions and intents. We conducted a 
comparative study of different machine learning algorithms against several 
performance measures to demonstrate their relative advantages. The 
proposed approach, when applied to 1,745 real world applications, 
provides more than 99% accuracy (which is best reported to date). 
Empirical results suggest that the proposed framework is effective in 
detection of malware apps including the obfuscated ones. 
In this thesis, we also present AndroPIn—an Android based 
malware detection algorithm using Permissions and Intents. It is designed 
with the methodology proposed in PInDroid. AndroPIn overcomes the 
limitation of stealthy techniques used by malware by exploiting the usage 
pattern of permissions and intents. These features, which play a major role 
in sharing user data and device resources cannot be obfuscated or 
altered. These vital features are well suited for resource constrained 
smartphones. Experimental evaluation on a corpus of real-world malware 
and benign apps demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can effectively 
detect malicious apps and is resilient to common obfuscations methods.  
Besides PInDroid and AndroPIn, this thesis consists of three 
additional studies, which supplement the proposed methodology. First 
study investigates if there is any correlation between permissions and 
intents which can be exploited to detect malware apps. For this, the 
statistical significance test is applied to investigate the correlation between 
permissions and intents. We found statistical evidence of a strong 
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correlation between permissions and intents which could be exploited to 
detect malware applications.  
The second study is conducted to investigate if the performance of 
classifiers can further be improved with ensemble learning methods. We 
applied different ensemble methods such as bagging, boosting and 
stacking. The experiments with ensemble methods yielded much improved 
results.  
The third study is related to investigating if the permissions and 
intents based system can be used to detect the ever challenging colluding 
apps. Application collusion is an emerging threat to Android based 
devices. We discuss the current state of research on app collusion and 
open challenges to the detection of colluding apps. We compare existing 
approaches and present an integrated approach that can be used to 
detect the malicious app collusion.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents malware threats to Android system, available 
malware detection solutions, their limitations and research gaps that this 
thesis aims to fill up with the novel contributions.  Author’s investigations of 
the problem, contributions, published work, methodology and 
implementation are elaborated in subsequent chapters. The thesis 
statement can be deduced as follows: 
 
Permissions and intents used by Android applications can be used to efficiently 
and accurately distinguish malware whilst remaining resilient to code 
obfuscation.                     
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1.2  Overview 
In the past few years, smartphones have evolved from simple 
mobile phones into sophisticated computers. They are much more 
portable and consume less energy in comparison to personal computers. 
This fact extends their usage in business and home related activities such 
as surfing the Internet, Emails, SMS and MMS messages, online 
transactions and Internet banking, etc. All of these features make the 
smartphone a useful tool in our daily lives, but at the same time they 
render it more vulnerable to attacks by malicious applications  [1]. Given 
that most users store sensitive information on their mobile phones, such 
as phone numbers, SMS messages, emails, pictures and videos, smart 
phones are a very appealing target for attackers and malware developers. 
Android OS was introduced by Google in 2008 for smartphones and 
by the fourth quarter of 2010, Android became the market leader by taking 
over global market share of nearly 85%. In May 2012, the number of 
available apps in the Google Play Store amounted to 500,000 and 
exceeded 1.4 Million apps in the third quarter of 2014 and increased to 3 
Million by March 2017 as shown in recently published statistics by 
Statista1.  
 
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-
the-google-play-store/ 
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Android is a Linux kernel based operating system and its 
applications are written in Java language by using built-in APIs. Its security 
framework is comprised of application sandboxing, application signing, 
cryptographic APIs, secure inter-process communication using intents and 
permission model [3]. Permission model is a main security mechanism to 
control the misuse of vital hardware and software resources [4, 5]. To 
protect the system and users, Android requires apps to request permission 
before the apps can use certain system data and features. The system 
grants the permission automatically, or it may ask the user to approve the 
request if the permissions are required to access the sensitive areas. 
However, its effectiveness relies on the user’s response and other built-in 
features, mainly the intents. Intent is a messaging object used to  request 
an action from another app component. It facilitates the inter-process 
communication between components of the same or different applications.  
Android being the market leader is the major target of Smartphone 
malware attacks [6]. The Android based mobile devices have been under 
constant attacks due to their ever increasing popularity and effortless 
development, improvising, re-packaging and publishing of apps [7, 8 and 
9]. Malware targeting the Android platform has increased caustically over 
the last two years [10]. Situation is getting worse with the provision of 
installing third party applications and the increasing number of seemingly 
benign apps with malign activities. Android security framework has not 
proven effective in stopping the malware proliferation [11].  
Existing end-point protections such as Anti-Virus software are 
unable to completely eliminate the malware threats [12, 13 and 14]. This is 
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due to the fact that most of the solutions are signature based and need 
regular updates to protect against increasing number of malware variants 
and they lack obfuscation resilience [15, 16, 17 and 18]. There is a need 
for innovative and resource rich detection solutions to overcome the 
challenges of limited resources of mobile devices, outdated signatures of 
AV solutions and code obfuscation techniques used by the malware. 
A lot of research had been done on permission based malware 
detection; however, intents were less explored till start of this thesis. 
Moreover, the major challenge to mobile malware detection is its limited 
resources that are characterized by short battery life, low memory and less 
processing power [19, 20 and 21]. 
We propose a novel methodology: PInDroid to fill up the research 
gap in the Android malware detection. Our goal is to provide mobile users 
with an effective malware detection method keeping in view the limited 
resources of mobile devices and versatility of malware behaviour.   
We conducted a comparative study of six machine learning 
algorithms against different performance measures to select the best 
classifier for malware classification. Decision Table came up as a robust 
and most efficient classifier in our extensive validation experiments. 
Performance of the proposed approach is verified by applying the 
technique to the real world malicious and benign samples.  
Different ensemble methods such as bagging, boosting and 
stacking are also investigated to ascertain if they can further improve the 
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detection results. A significant improvement is attainable with application 
of ensemble methods.  
The proposed methodology is also implemented as a malware 
detection algorithm: AndroPIn, which has been tested on different real 
malware samples. The performance of AndroPIn is comparable to existing 
state-of-the-art solutions.   
Additionally, permissions and intents are also investigated for 
detection of malicious colluding and obfuscated apps respectively. 
Colluding apps are those apps which cooperate using covert or overt 
communication means to perform a joint malicious action which they are 
not able to perform separately. Code Obfuscation is the process of 
modifying the code of app so that it is understandable. Malware writers 
deliberately obfuscate code to conceal its purpose or its logic in order to 
prevent someone reading the source code. While the process may modify 
actual method instructions or metadata, it does not alter the output of the 
program. The results of the studies on detection of colluding apps and 
obfuscated apps are presented in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The thesis poses the following research questions: 
Q1: Is a set of permissions able to distinguish malware from benign 
applications? (Chapter 3) 
Q2: Can the occurrences of intents be used for discriminating a 
malware from a trusted application? (Chapter 3) 
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Q3: Is there any combinations of permissions and intents frequently 
used by malware which can classify malware and benign 
applications? (Chapter 3 and 4) 
Q6: Can obfuscated malware apps be detected with the approach? 
(Chapter 3) 
Q4: Can we ascertain which machine learning algorithm is best for 
mobile malware detection? (Chapter 4) 
Q5: Can ensemble methods be applied to optimise the classifiers 
output? (Chapter 4) 
Q7:  Can we extend our approach to detect the ever increasing 
threat of colluding applications? (Chapter 5) 
1.4 Contributions 
 The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 Permissions and Intents amalgamation. This is the first work 
which is combining two vital security mechanisms of Android OS - 
permissions and intents - for malware detection.  
 
 Investigation of inter-dependence between permissions and 
intents.  We accomplish an extensive evaluation of permissions 
and intents used by Android apps to understand their inter 
dependence and show how this interdependence could be used to 
stop the malware syndrome. 
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 Machine learning algorithms comparison. We conducted a 
comparative study of several machine learning algorithms to 
understand which classifier performs best to detect malware.  
 Ensemble methods for performance improvements. We exploit 
different ensemble methods to ascertain if their application can 
further improve the detection accuracy. 
 Detection of colluding applications. We investigate the 
mechanisms used by the colluding apps and explore the possibility 
of extending our approach to detect the colluding apps. 
 Detection of Obfuscated applications. We investigate the 
obfuscation used by malicious apps and applied our approach to 
detect the obfuscated malicious apps. 
 Developing the malware detection algorithm. We develop an 
algorithm to detect the malware using the permissions and intents 
of target apps. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the introduction to Android system, applications 
taxonomies and architecture. It also presents an overview of malware, its 
types, evolution, propagation methods and characteristics and the 
malware detection approaches. A detailed survey on existing state of the 
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art techniques used for malware detection is also delineated. Some of the 
most cited works are compared with our proposed approach and the 
research gap is identified. 
Chapter 3 presents the two vital features of Android: Permissions 
and Intents which have been used in our proposed methodology for the 
detection of malware apps. The statistical correlation approach is also 
described which is used to test if there is any correlation between 
permissions and intents. Our categorization of permissions and intent into 
dangerous and normal types is also explained. Mostly used permissions 
and intents by malicious and benign apps are discussed. It also describes 
the outcomes of study carried out to investigate the distinguishing usage 
pattern of permissions and intents by malicious and benign apps and if 
these patterns can be exploited for malware detection. A malware 
detection algorithm based on permissions and intents: AndroPIn is also 
presented. Experimental results demonstrate that the AndroPIn can be 
used for malware detection. 
Chapter 4 presents the proposed methodology of PInDroid. 
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms used to classify the malware apps are 
discussed. Comparison of ML algorithms against different performance 
metrics is described systematically. To validate the proposed approach, 
different experiments are carried out which are discussed with details of 
experimental setup and configurations. Results are discussed in terms of 
various performance measures such as True Positive Rate (TPR), False 
Positive Rate (FPR), accuracy and F-measure.  
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Different ensemble methods such as boosting, bagging and 
stacking are also presented that are used to optimize the classification 
results.  To validate the proposed approach, different experiments were 
carried out which are discussed with details of experimental setup and 
configurations. Results are discussed in terms of accuracy.  
Chapter 5 presents a research study on colluding apps. It 
investigates the attacking behaviour of app collusion and main features 
that facilitate the collusion. It also explores the possibility of applying the 
PInDroid methodology for detection of malicious colluding apps.   
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of its key 
achievements, challenges and open ended research questions which may 
be relevant to future research studies. 
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Chapter 2 
A Survey on Android and Malware 
Detection Systems 
2.1 Overview 
A malware is (short for “malicious software”) is considered an 
annoying or harmful type of software intended to secretly access a device 
without the user's knowledge [22].  Android has become the most widely 
used OS for smartphones, therefore is target of growing attacks from 
cyber criminals [23]. The vulnerabilities of the operating system and 
applications are being exploited by the hackers to penetrate into the 
systems, steal user data and gain financial benefits [24, 25, and 26]. 
Android malware is evolving in a rapid manner. According to 
McAfee Security Company, its database contains more than 100 million 
samples as Android malware has increased multifold over the years [27]. 
Detection of new malware apps has become quite challenging due to new 
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stealth techniques and encapsulation methods being used by malware. 
Existing Android antivirus solutions are less effective in detecting and 
combating highly sophisticated malware [28].  
The objective of this chapter is to survey the state-of-the-art of 
malware detection approaches in order to identify specific factors affecting 
the performance of the malware detection systems, identify the state of the 
art analysis methods used to reduce the false positive rate and further 
investigate how these approaches can be improved on. The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, Android architecture, 
application framework and Android security architecture are discussed. 
Section 2.3 details different types of malware, the classifications of 
malware and Section 2.4  describes the malware analysis techniques, 
detection systems and identifies their strengths and limitations as well as 
most recent potential solutions to these limitations. Finally, Section 2.5 to 
2.7 focuses specifically on feature based detection systems and details the 
analytical techniques used in such systems. 
2.2 Android Operating System 
Android platform was developed by Android Inc. in 2003 for the 
devices with limited resources (processing power, memory and storage 
space). It is based on a modified version of the Linux kernel version 2.6.25 
[33]. Android architecture and its main components are discussed in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
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2.2.1 Architecture 
The Android architecture shown in Figure 2.1 is composed of 
several software stacks which that can be divided into three main groups: 
Linux Kernel/ Operating System (OS), Middleware and Applications. 
Green components are written in native code (C/C++), while blue items 
are Java components interpreted and executed by the Dalvik Virtual 
Machine. The red components belong to the Linux [2]. 
 
Figure 2.1: Android platform architecture  
                        Source: http://elinux.org/Android_Architecture 
2.2.1.1 Linux Kernel 
Initial versions of Android OS were built on the Linux 2.6 kernel1 
with some architectural changes which include wake locks, a memory 
management system and the Binder IPC driver etc. Version 1.0 and above  
1Computing Handbook, Third Edition: Computer Science and Software Engineering 
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are based on the Linux 3.3 kernel. Linux kernel is the basic layer of 
Android which contains all the hardware drivers. It manages and 
processes requests for hardware resources.  
2.2.1.2 Middleware 
The middleware comprises of native libraries and Android Runtime.  
 Libraries  
Android Libraries are written in C/C++ programming 
language and can be used through the Application framework. 
These are external libraries which are modified to make them 
compatible with ARM hardware and Android’s implementation.   
 Android Runtime 
Android Runtime includes Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) and 
core java libraries [34]. DVM is used to execute applications written 
in Java language.  
o Dalvik Virtual Machine 
  DVM runs multiple VMs at the same time ensuring isolation, 
security and threading support without overloading the processor. 
DVM executes files in .dex fi le format which is an optimized java 
code for the low resource systems and are created from .class file 
during compilation [34]. 
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 Core Java Libraries 
 These are implementation of general purpose APIs for use by 
the applications executed by the DVM.  
 
2.2.1.3 Application framework 
The android applications are developed by using some basic tools 
which manage the primary functions of device, for example, calls 
reception, text messaging and monitoring of battery usage etc. Some of 
the important blocks of Application framework are described below:-  
 Activity Manager 
 The activity Manager keeps the track of all active 
applications of the device and also inhibits the background 
processes in case of memory shortage. It also identifies those 
applications which do not respond to an input event for more than 
five seconds.  
 Content Providers 
Content Providers are responsible for data sharing among 
different applications [2]. For example, photos and contact list can 
be accessed by multiple applications therefore these are stored in 
content provider.  
 
 Telephony Manager 
 Telephony manager manages the phone calls and also 
enables access to parameters like set’s (IMEI).  
33 
 
 Location Manager 
The location Manager is responsible for providing the 
location services which are used by different applications to 
determine the geographical location by using embedded GPS or 
cell tower communication. 
 Resource Manager 
Resource Manager manages the resources which are used 
by different applications.  
2.2.1.4 Applications 
 Applications are the top most layer responsible for the interaction 
between user and the device. Mostly devices are pre-installed with some  
applications by the manufacturer to perform basic daily tasks like browser, 
e-mail, phone call, calculator, calendar etc) however users can install any 
app on their device from official or unofficial markets.  
Android applications are written in the Java programming language. 
Android uses the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) and Java's 
programming environments, such as Eclipse or Netbeans to compile Java 
code and create an Android Package (APK) file. Applications are 
published with a unique Linux user ID and each application is granted its 
own VM to isolate it from the system resources and other applications.  
2.2.2 Components of Application 
Android applications come as .apk file which is signed ZIP files that  
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contain the app’s byte code along with all its data, resources, libraries and 
a manifest file [35]. The APK files are installed on the device using the 
Android Debug Bridge tool (adb) or by downloading them from Android's 
Market. An APK file consists of three main elements which are 
Manifest.xml, classes.dex and resources as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Android APK file 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Android Permissions screen 
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There are four protection levels assigned to the permissions 
depending on the capabilities and possible security risks. These 
groups are Signature or system, signature, dangerous and normal 
permissions. Android has an access system to check against these 
levels to ascertain that if the app should be granted the permission 
or not [36]. 
 Classes .Dex 
This file is the compiled Java source code. It contains Dex byte 
code for the application and runs on the DVM [34]. 
 Resources 
Resources include the libraries, files and pictures which are 
used by the application. 
2.2 Android Security Model 
Android is an open source operating system and securing an open 
source system requires robust and flexible security framework. Android’s 
security is dependent upon the user’s understanding of applications and 
system. Android security is mainly focused on the protection of user data 
and system resources as well as the application isolation. To achieve 
these goals, it relies on Linux kernel, application sandboxing, secure IPC, 
application signing and permissions [34]. Some of the key security 
features of Android security framework are discussed in subsequent sub 
paragraphs. 
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2.3.1 System and Kernel Level Security 
 Android provides conventional security guarantees of Linux kernel 
with an addition of secure IPC for maintaining the isolation between 
applications [34].  
2.3.2 The Application Sandbox 
 Android uses Linux user-based protection for identification and 
isolation of applications. Android creates a kernel level sandbox for each 
application where each application has its own user id and it runs in its 
own process. Applications interaction with system resources and other 
applications is controlled with permissions. Application sandbox is equally 
effective in exercising same controls on the system applications and native 
code as it lies in the kernel level. The operating system libraries, 
application framework, their runtime, and applications run within the 
application sandbox [8, 34, 36]. 
2.3.3 File system Permissions 
These permissions ensure privacy of user’s information (files). In 
case of Android, files of one application are not shared with other 
applications unless the developer ensures such a provision [37].  
2.3.4 Security-Enhanced Linux 
Android uses Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) for access 
control. SELinux is a Linux kernel security module that provides a 
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mechanism for supporting access control security policies including 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) system [34]. It provides a mechanism to 
enforce the separation of information based on confidentiality and integrity 
requirements, which allows threats of tampering, and bypassing of 
application security mechanisms, to be addressed and enables the 
confinement of damage that can be caused by malicious or flawed 
applications. It includes a set of sample security policy configuration files 
designed to meet common, general-purpose security goals1. 
2.3.5 Android Permission Model  
The Android applications have limited access to system resources. 
The permission model manages the access to system resources and 
restricts them by linking the access with permissions  [38]. During the 
application installation phase, the permissions are requested to access the 
resources as a whole, thereby, li nking the application installation with the 
grant of permissions [39]. Hence, denial is not an option for the intended 
user. Once granted, until recently, the permissions were for the entire 
duration of the installed application. However, in the latest versions of 
Android, the user can scroll and select/de-select the permissions. In such 
cases, some features of the app will not work due to non-availability of 
required permissions.  Applications can also set their own permissions for 
other applications [40, 41]. The permissions are defined (how and who) in 
a protection level attribute which communicates with the system for the 
purpose [42, 43].  
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux 
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2.3.6 Protected APIs 
The resources which are only accessible by the operating system 
only are called protected APIs [44]. The examples are Camera, GPS, 
telephony, Bluetooth, SMS/MMS and network/data. In order to use these 
resources, it is essential that the application defines them in its manifest.  
2.3.7 Cost Sensitive APIs 
APIs which may involve cost in their usage are categorized as cost 
sensitive APIs which include telephony, SMS/MMS, Data/Network and 
NFC [45]. These APIs are included in the OS controlled list of protected 
APIs for which an exclusive approval from the device’s user is required [5].  
2.3.8 Inter Components Communication (ICC) 
Inter-Component Communication Android application consists of 
components. There are four kinds of components, activities, services, 
broadcasts and providers [46]. Android platform provides a secure ICC 
that is similar to IPC to the Unix system. ICC is provided by the binder 
mechanism which is in the middleware layer of Android. The binder is a 
remote procedure call that is from a custom Linux driver (Android 
Developers). ICC is achieved by intents. Intent is a message that shows 
the target with some data optionally [47]. It can be used in explicit 
communication if it identifies the name of the receiver, or used in the 
implicit communication that let the receiver see if it can access this intent 
or not. 
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Inter process communication takes place via traditional UNIX-type 
mechanism within the ambit of Linux permissions. Components of Android 
IPC are described below: 
      Binder  
        It is a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanism to handle in-
process and cross-process calls. 
     Services 
Services can provide interfaces directly accessible using binder. 
      Intents 
 Intent is a communication mechanism which tells the system 
about the intention to do some action [48, 49]. For example, if a 
website is to be opened, the ‘intent’  is sent to the system open the 
corresponding URL. The system would hand over the intent to the 
browser to carry out the action required by the intent.  
     Content Providers 
   A Content Provider facilitates to use the device’s data [50] 
such as the contact list or music preferences.  An application can 
access the data that is provided by the other applications through 
Content Provider, and it can define its own Content Providers to 
share its own data as well [51, 52]. 
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2.3.9 Application Signing 
Android requires that all apps be signed by the developers with 
a digital certificate before installing on app store. If the app is not digitally 
signed then its installation is blocked by the Google Play store and installer 
package. Application signing is used to identify the developer of app and 
to update the application without complicated procedures and further 
permissions [53]. It also facilitates the inter-app communication through 
well-defined IPC [54]. APK files contain the developer signature which is 
verified by the Package Manager [55]. Android does not carry out CA 
verification of application certificates. The app signing key creates a digital 
certificate which contains the public key of a public/private key pair, as well 
as some other metadata identifying the owner of the key. The owner of the 
certificate holds the corresponding private key. When a developer sign an 
APK, the signing tool attaches the public-key certificate to it and 
associates the APK to the developer and its corresponding private key. 
This helps Android ensure that future app are legitimate and from the 
creator of app. Every app must use the same certificate throughout its 
lifespan in order for users to be able to install new versions as updates to 
the app. Applications can share user ID if they are signed with the same 
certificate [56]. 
2.3.10   Sensitive User Data 
Android has some APIs that may provide access to user data 
of protected APIs [34]. Sensitive user data is classified into three groups 
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namely personal information, sensitive input devices and device metadata 
as shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2. 4: Types of sensitive user data 
Source: https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/ 
 Personal Information  
  The content providers that contain personal information like 
contacts and calendar etc are controlled with clearly defined 
permissions users can get idea of the type of data which can 
accessed by the  application. [34, 6]. Any application can access 
these resources if user grants the controlled permissions to the 
requesting app. By default, any application which collects personal 
information will restrict the data to the specific application; however, it 
can share the data with other applications using IPC and permissions 
mechanisms [57]. 
 Sensitive Data Input Devices  
 Android devices have sensitive data input sensors that allow 
many applications to interact with the external medium, such as 
GPS, microphone and camera. In case a third-party application 
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requires accesses to these resources, it will need to request user to 
grant the permissions [5, 58].  
 Device Metadata  
 Android restricts access to sensitive data but it may share 
certain important information like user preferences or the manner in 
which user uses his device. The applications can only access the key 
resources with appropriate permissions. In case, permission is not 
granted, the installation will not proceed further [5, 6]. 
2.3.11    Publishing and Distribution of Apps 
Publishing makes the Android apps ready for distribution to the 
users. Publishing involves two main tasks: 
 Preparation of the application for release 
 A release version of app is buildup which can be 
downloaded and installed on the Android devices. 
 Release of application to users  
Application release involves the publicity, sell, and 
distribution of the release version of application to users  [3]. Apps 
are released through app marketplaces, such as Google Play. 
However, apps can also be downloaded from some websites or 
through email. Android application is released on Google Play by 
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configuring its options, uploading the assets and finally publishing 
the application [5]. 
2.4 Mobile Malware 
Mobile Malware is malicious and an unwanted piece of software 
targeting mobile phones by damaging the device and loss or leakage of 
confidential data. First mobile malware surfaced in 2004 against Symbian 
operating system. First malware targeting Android was reported in 2010 
and by 2011, Android became the most favorite OS of malware 
encountering attacks every few weeks by new malware families [7]. Four 
types of the most common malware affecting mobile devices are 
expander, worm, Trojan and spyware. Expanders target mobiles for 
additional phone billing and profit. Worm endlessly reproduce itself and 
spread to other devices. Mobile worms may be transmitted via text 
messages SMS or MMS and typically do not require user interaction for 
execution [59]. Trojan horse always requires user interaction to be 
activated. This kind of virus is usually inserted into seemingly attractive 
and non-malicious executable files or applications that are downloaded to 
the device and executed by the user [60]. Once activated, the malware 
can cause serious damage by infecting and deactivating other applications 
or the phone itself, rendering it paralyzed after a certain period of time or a 
certain number of operations. Spyware poses a threat to mobile devices 
by collecting, using, and spreading a user's personal or sensitive 
information without the user's consent or knowledge.  
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2.4.1 Types of Android Malware 
Mobile malware targeting Android smartphone is significant and 
growing at an alarming rate. This section briefly describes the common 
types of malicious programs targeting mobile phones. There are four 
broad categories1 of mobile malware in addition to backdoor and worm 
malware. Backdoor helps other malware to enter the system without user 
knowledge by evading the system protections [61]. Worms make their 
copies and spread those copies through network or removable media. 
(i) Trojans and Viruses 
Viruses, worms, Trojans, and bots are a ll malware2. Trojans are 
those malware which look like some legitimate application but have 
hidden harmful malicious code which when executed inflicts serious 
damage to the device [62].  Trojanized apps are the biggest threat to 
the android devices as they can control the browser and steal 
account details including the bank login information. Trojans are 
viruses, which can be installed in different ways and can inflict 
damages ranging from simply annoying to highly-destructive and 
irreparable. Mobile viruses can root the device and gain unauthorized 
access to sensitive files and memory. 
(ii) Spyware and Adware 
 Spyware are those malware which secretly steal user’s data  
1https://www.veracode.com/blog/2013/10/common-mobile-malware-types-        
cybersecurity-101 
2 https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/virus-differences.html 
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and shares with third parties for various purposes including the future 
attacks. In some cases these may be advertisers or marketing firms 
[63], which is why spyware is sometimes referred to as “adware”. 
Adware are those applications which are using ad libraries. They 
gather the user’s data to show relevant ads to the users for 
marketing purpose. Ad libraries cause privacy leaks and can frustrate 
the user by showing unwanted image or notifications repeatedly on 
the screen [64]. Spyware and Adware are typically installed without 
user consent by disguising itself as a legitimate app or by infecting its 
payload on a legitimate app.  
(iii) Phishing Apps 
Mobile phishing apps use same conventional web phishing 
techniques to infect the mobile devices. There are mobile phishing 
websites which look harmless but they covertly steal user’s 
credentials. The smaller screen of mobile devices is making 
malicious phishing techniques easier to hide from users. Some 
phishing schemes use Trojanized mobile apps, disguising their 
malicious action as a system update, marketing offer or game.  
(iv) Botnets 
 A bot is a type of malware that allows an attacker to take control 
over an affected mobile device. Bots are usually part of a network of 
infected mobile phones, known as a “botnet”, which is typically made 
up of victim mobile phones that stretch across the globe. They allow 
hackers to take control of many mobile phones at a time, and turn 
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them into "zombie" phones, which operate as part of a powerful 
"botnet" to spread viruses, generate spam, and commit other types of 
online crime and fraud. Botnets infect the device by accessing the 
device’s resources and data; helping botnet masters to control the 
device. They exploit the system vulnerabilities and un-patched 
devices. They keep spreading over other devices by sending text 
messages or emails to the contacts of the infected device. Hidden 
processes can secretly run executable or contact bot masters for 
new instructions without user’s knowledge. Future botnet are 
envisaged to have more serious damages and can completely hijack 
and control infected devices. 
2.4.2 Malware Propagation 
Malware use different sophisticated methods to spread over 
mobile devices [65]. Some of the widely used malware propagation 
methods are: 
(i) Infected websites 
         Cybercriminals design malicious websites that exploit system 
vulnerabilities to spread the malware easily [66]. Mobile devices are 
infected when their users access such websites from the device.  
 
(ii) Third party app markets 
Third-party app stores have loose security controls over the 
applications developed and uploaded by unknown parties [67].  
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Malicious developers can upload Trojanized apps which can be 
downloaded by user, if the app has some appealing functionality. 
Third party stores also distribute the repackaged apps which are 
some popular apps installed with some malicious code, repackaged 
and distributed. 
(iii) Spam Emails and Botnets 
Propagating a malware by spam email is simple and effective 
propagation method. Attackers may send emails to the victims which 
appear to come from trusted sources such as the user’s bank, 
Amazon, Paypal or from own contacts. They contain links to some 
malicious website, compelling them to change their password and 
then sending the login information to a cybercriminal, or they may 
have infected attachments that immediately begin collecting data on 
their own once opened. Bots also propagate malware by sending text 
messages or e-mails to the contacts of infected user with a malicious 
link.  
(iv) Worms 
Mobile worms are similar to viruses in that they replicate 
themselves and can cause the damage. Unlike viruses, worms are 
standalone software and do not require an infected file or human 
help to propagate. They propagate over other devices through 
different exploits and system vulnerabilities. 
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(v) Onscreen Adware 
Some attractive ads are run on user’s screen as a sidebar with 
some game or other app, which when clicked by the user lands him 
on some malicious website. 
(vi) Dynamic Payload 
Hiding some malicious code in the APK resources file and 
executing it with Dex Class Loader API after installing it with the main 
application. 
(vii) App Updates 
Malicious code is hidden in updates which if installed by the 
user can infect the device. 
2.5 Malware Detection Systems 
Smartphone security and malware detection is an emerging 
research field where topics of publications are scattered within this 
domain. In this section, we present different most cited works on Android 
malware detection. We present related state of the art research studies, 
and systems developed by different researchers in Table 2.1.    
2.5.1 Malware Analysis 
 A number of studies focus on analyzing Android’s security 
mechanisms. Felt et al. [4] analysed the real mobile malware and carried 
out a ccomprehensive survey of behaviour of 46 malware samples related 
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to three smartphone platforms (Android, iOS and Symbian) emerged 
between 2009 and 2011. In a similar type of study, Zhou et al. [7] covers 
1260 Android malware samples distributed among 49 different malware 
families. Their findings confirm the increase in sophistication and 
obfuscation by the malware. Some researchers [59, 60, and 61] have 
proposed to rely on code clone detection techniques to identify similarity in 
repackaged and piggybacked apps. The piggybacked apps are those 
benign apps which are unpacked by malware writers and inserted with 
some malicious code then repackaged and distributed for free.  A 
significant amount of research has been conducted into privacy leaks and 
ad libraries [62, 63, 64 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. Most of the proposed 
approaches are based on permission usage and other security risks, such 
as the potential to load and execute arbitrary byte code through the ad 
interface.  
Due to known limitations of signature based methods, behaviour 
analysis has gained attention from anti-malware research community. One 
of such work is Risk Ranker [71] which targets zero-day malware samples. 
It examines the apps for presence of dangerous behaviours like using root 
exploits and SMS sending and classifies them according to the associated 
risk levels. Crowdroid [72] is also behaviour based approach which 
observes the run-time system calls to generate app profile and applies 
machine learning algorithms to distinguish between the malware and 
benign apps. Droidchamleon [73] evaluated the performance of ten 
commercial mobile anti-malware products against the common 
obfuscation techniques. Andromaly [74] used different network statistics 
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for detecting deviations in application’s network behaviour. AppGuard [75] 
facilitates the enforcement of user-customizable security policies on 
untrusted Android apps. MADAM [76] proposed the analysis of kernel level 
features (CPU usage, system calls, memory usage etc) and user level 
features (key strokes, called numbers, SMS etc) to detect malware. 
Droidscope [77] provides sandboxed monitoring of app features at 
hardware, OS, and Dalvik Virtual Machine levels. PScout [78] proposd 
permission based behaviour analysis of malicious apps. Xmandroid [79] 
dynamically analysed the transitive permission usage to detect covert 
channels. Woodpecker [80] combined static and dynamic analysis to 
identify explicit and implicit leakage. 
A considerable effort has been focussed on understanding the 
Android permission model as well as using it for the malware detection. 
Kirin [81] is more towards blocking the installation of apps that request 
dangerous combination of permissions, while Sarma et al. [82] assessed 
the permissions usage by the apps to evaluate the level of associated 
risks and [83] used the requested permissions to rebuild the malicious 
behaviours of apps to categorize them according to their security 
perceptive. 
 
Another Android based security research track is towards the Inter-
Component Communication (ICC) mechanism. Erika et al. [84] 
investigated the inter-application communication to verify the possible 
attacks and exploits of interacting components.  Their tool ComDroid could 
be used by application developers to detect the application communication 
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vulnerabilities. Long et al. [85] studied the component hijacking 
vulnerability of Android apps by inspecting the data flow activities and 
developed a static analysing tool CHEX which detects the component 
hijacking vulnerability. A similar tool EPICC was devised by Damien [39] to 
detect the ICC vulnerabilities, while [86] worked to prevent confused 
deputy and collusion attacks. 
2.5.2   State of the Art approaches for Malware Detection  
Some of the most cited works are highlighted in Table 2.1 along 
with the methodologies, advantages / disadvantages and years of 
publication. Most of the existing approaches are based on analysis of 
permissions, APIs or system calls. Permissions have been widely 
analyzed by the researchers, but intents were relatively untouched till the 
start of this work in 2013. Permissions and intents are either analyzed 
separately or combined with randomly selected features such as API calls, 
network statistics and memory usage etc.  
Summarizing, there is no such a study which had investigated 
the correlation between permissions and intents. Our work is the first 
which investigates the inter-dependence of permissions and intents and 
how this correlation could be exploited for detecting the stealthy malicious 
activities. Our approach exploits the inherent inter-correlation and inter-
dependence of these two mechanisms. Our approach benefits in terms of 
accuracy and efficiency by relying on low-dimensional and most relevant 
set of features. This work fills up the gap in the Android malware research.  
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The closest latest works are Marvin, Drebin and Droidmat since 
these approaches are using permissions and intents in addition to many 
other features like API calls, network statistics, components etc. However, 
there is no clear rational or study which uses intent exclusively as a 
feature for malware detection. Drebin and DroidMat use same feature set: 
Permissions, API calls, components, IPC, intent messages related to 
activate components only whilst Marvin uses permissions, API calls, 
dynamic loaded codes and intents related to broadcast receivers only.  
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Table 2.1 Overview of existing work 
S No Reference Year Methodology Contributions  
1.  AndroDialysis[48] 2017 Intents analysis to investigate their effectiveness to 
detect malware 
Validation of intent as a decisive feature for malware 
detection 
2.  Deep Android [189] 2017 It uses deep convolutional neural network (CNN).  
Malware classification with static analysis of the raw 
opcode sequence from a disassembled program 
Applications need to be disassembled for analysis 
3.  Stormdroid [161] 2016 Analysing static features (permissions, API calls), 
sequences and dynamic behaviours using ML 
techniques 
It requires both static and dynamic analyses and root  
access for run time process analysis 
4.  ICCDetector [185] 2016 Analysis of intents to detect the Inter component  
communication vulnerabilities 
Focuses only to find out communication vulnerabilities 
5.  APK Auditor[93] 2015 Permission-based malware detection using static 
analysis 
Analysis is done on central server. Client needs an 
internet connection with the server for the malware 
analysis and detection 
6.  CopperDroid [107] 2015 It carries out VMI-based dynamic analysis to 
reconstruct the behaviours of malware.  
Needs root access to monitor the system calls 
7.  TaintDroid[62] 2014 Dynamic taint tracking of API calls.  This can handle only  privacy violations  
8.  DroidMiner[63] 
 
2014 Detection by generating                                       
Programming logics based behaviours of malicious 
apps 
Non résilient to code transformation techniques 
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9.  DenDroid [64]  
 
2014 Text mining and  information retrieval based 
classification  
System is unable to handle Code obfuscation 
10.   Apposcopy [65] 
 
2014 Semantics-Based Detection  Signature based approach thus detection scope limited to 
certain known malware. 
11.   AndroSimilar 
[60] 
2014 Signatures based AV solution to detect similar Android 
applications 
Detection of repackaged applications only. 
12.   AdRob[61] 2013 Permissions analysis Study on impact of Android Application Plagiarism 
13.   VetDroid[66] 2013  
Permission Analysis 
High computation cost and complex design 
14.   AppProfiler[67] 
 
2013 Static and dynamic analyses of API calls and 
permissions. 
Can detect privacy leaks only. 
15.   AppPlayground 
[53] 
2013 Dynamic analysis of system calls, API calls and taint 
tracing.  
Root access required 
16.   Secloud[56] 2013 A cloud based system offering different detection 
techniques: SYS call monitoring, AV scanning and  file 
integrity check  
Root access required 
17.   Epicc[68] 
 
2013 Static  analysis of ICC ,APIs and Intent 
 
Limited to ICC vulnerabilities 
18.   DroidChameleon 
 [73] 
 
2013 Different code transformation techniques implemented 
to evaluate the performance of ten anti-malware 
products for their resilience against malware 
transformations 
Scope of work is to evaluate the anti-malware products 
and not the malware detection. 
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19.   Andromaly[74] 
 
2013 
 
Behaviour monitoring in terms of CPU usage, battery  
consumption and number of sent packets on WIFI.   
Analysis is done on self-made malware apps only as they 
couldn’t find any real world malware samples. 
20.   DroidMOSS [59] 2012 Detection of repackaged applications with fuzzy 
Hashing technique.  
Repackaged applications can only be detected 
21.   MADAM 
[76] 
 
2012 Detection with System calls and permissions  Limited dataset. In total 60 apps monitored (10 malicious 
and 50 benign) 
22.   AppGuard 
[75] 
2012 Permission misuse analysis No detection of Malware 
23.   DroidScope 
[77] 
2012  Semantics based detection  Root access required 
24.   RiskRanker 
[71] 
2012 Analysis of root exploits, permissions, API calls, crypto, 
dynamic code, IPC. 
 
Root-exploit detection scheme depends on signatures,  
which implies that it can detect only known exploits and 
may also miss encrypted or obfuscated exploits.  
25.   PScout[78] 2012 Permissions analysis  
26.   Dr. Android and Mr. 
Hide[83] 
2012 Permissions analysis  
27.   AdSplit[46] 2012 Permissions analysis Separating smartphone advertising from applications 
28.   AndroidLeaks 
[47] 
2012  Privacy leaks only 
29.   Woodpecker [69] 2012 Uses CFG and permission analysis  Complex design 
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30.   RobotDroid[70] 2012 API calls Root access required 
31.   PiOS [70] 2011 Uses CFG  Privacy leaks only 
32.   Xmandroid[80] 2011 ICC analysis  
33.   Crowdroid [87] 2011 Monitors SYS calls, list of running applications and the 
device information.  
Root access required  
 
34.   Paranoid android[88] 
 
2010 Dynamic analysis of API calls and Permissions. Root access required 
35.   Kirin [81] 2009 
 
Detection by analysing certain combinations of 
permissions and API calls.  
Detects privacy leaks only. 
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Chapter 3 
Investigating Permissions and Intents for 
Malware Detection 
3.1 Introduction 
Permission model is a vital security mechanism which guards 
against the misuse of hardware and software resources; however, it relies 
on the user’s response and other built-in features such as intent, which is 
a communication mechanism which facilitates the use of different 
functionalities offered by the components of same application or other 
applications [95]. Intent spoofing and permission collusion are few 
examples of attacks due to misuse of intents [96, 97]. Although, a 
significant research work has been carried out to investigate the 
permission model and API calls for detection of mobile malware but less 
work is done on Intents. 
This chapter investigates Android permissions and intents to 
understand their role in basic functionality of apps and how that role can 
be exploited by the cyber criminals for malicious attacks. Such an 
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understanding will help in devising a novel malware detection solution 
based on permissions and intents to effectively detect the malicious 
activities. Malware analysis by combining the permissions and intents is 
carried out to deduce the usage pattern of these vital features that can be 
exploited to distinguish between the malware and benign apps.   
We present an automated malware detection algorithm: AndroPIn 
which is based on permissions and intents declared in the Manifest file. 
Once declared, these vital features cannot be altered by code obfuscation 
or encryption, hence making our proposed approach resi lient to code 
obfuscation. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents 
the basic background information about permissions and intents, Section 
3.3 discusses the investigation findings, and Section 3.4 presents the 
statistical testing details carried out to understand the correlation between 
permissions and intents. Section 3.5 presents the AndroPIn malware 
detection algorithm and Section 3.6 discusses its implementation aspects. 
Section 3.7 gives the details of experiments and result. Final ly the Section 
3.8 summarizes the chapter. 
3.2 Background 
Android has 117 permissions and 227 intents in version 4.4, API 
level 19 - an API level is an integer value which identifies the application’s 
compatibility with the Android versions. The earliest A ndroid version: API 
level 1, contains only 76 permissions and 124 intents. Google adds new 
permissions and intents into every upcoming version. This trend is 
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depicted in Table 3.1, where monotonic increment in permission and 
intents against the API levels is obvious. The increased number of 
permissions and intents has not only added new features but also opened 
the doors for malware. A meticulous analysis of permissions and intents 
used by the apps will help to construct the behavioural image of apps for 
malware detection. 
Table 3.1: Number of permissions and intents in API levels 
API Level No of 
Permissions 
No of Intents 
 
23 135 252 
22 124 243 
21 123 238 
20 118 227 
19 117 227 
18 106 221 
17 103 214 
16 103 203 
15 99 201 
14 99 191 
13 97 180 
12 96 180 
11 96 176 
10 96 167 
09 95 167 
08 92 167 
07 88 161 
06 88 158 
05 88 158 
04 87 146 
03 83 136 
02 78 124 
01 76 124 
 
It is found during investigation of apps that certain permissions and intents 
are repetitively used by malware apps which can distinguish them from 
benign ones.  
3.2.1 Android Permissions 
Permission model is the basic security feature of android system 
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which provides access to the vital organs of android based devices [98]. 
These are embedded in the manifest file of applications and declared as 
shown in Figure 3.1 [6]. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Declaration of Android permission. 
 In earlier versions of Android, permissions were required to be 
granted as a whole and not in parts [99]. There was no choice to select the 
permissions from the offered ones; user had to accept all the permissions 
and install the app or reject and didn’t install. Once granted, these 
permissions would remain effective for the lifetime of the installed app unti l 
changed through an update [100]. However, on Android version 6.0 and 
above, user can control the installation of permissions with capability 
compromises.  
3.2.2   Android Intents 
Android intent is the basic communication mechanism used for 
exchanging inter and intra application messages. Functionalities and 
capabilities of different apps can be combined with the use of intents  [101]. 
A malicious app may trick the user to install some other collaborating app 
for getting additional features. User is then prompted two different sets of 
permissions by these two different apps but because they share their 
functionalities cowardly through sending /receiving intents, the user being 
ignorant of this feature might install both apps  which would harm his 
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device [102]. Intents are embedded in the manifest file and declared as 
shown in Figure 3.2 [34]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Declaration of Android Intents. 
3.3 Analysis of Permissions and Intents  
We carried out a comprehensive review of Android security 
framework and existing research work on malware detection to establish 
the distinguishing key features of Android apps which could facilitate the 
malware detection.  
A total of 500 apps (270 malware and 230 benign) were analysed 
which are collected from well-known sources such as Google Playstore1, 
Mobango2. Contagiodump3, Genome4, Virus Total5, theZoo6 and 
MalShare7. These sources contain the datasets of already known malware 
samples. The benign apps are selected from different categories such as 
social, news, entertainment, finance, education, games, sports, music, and 
audio, telephony, messaging, shopping, banking, and weather. Selection  
1Google Play, Web: https://play.google.com/store?hl=en 
2Web: http://www.mobango.com/ 
3Contagio Mobile: mobile malware mini dump, Web: 
http://contagiominidump.blogspot.co.uk/ 
4Android Malware Genome Project, Web: http://www.malgenomeproject.org/ 
5VirusTotal for Android, Web: 
https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/mobile- 
applications/ 
6theZoo aka Malware DB, Web: http://ytisf.github.io/theZoo/ 
7MalShare project, Web: http://malshare.com/about.php 
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of malware and benign samples is carefully done to learn the malicious 
and normal behaviour of apps.  
Our investigation of Android security framework, the existing state-
of-the-art malware detection approaches, Android features used by most 
of these approaches (permissions, intents, API calls, system calls, ICC) 
and analysis of benign and malware samples resulted in interesting 
finding: identification of key features: permissions and intents used for 
malware attacks and propagation. 
We also establish that certain permissions and intents which are 
frequently used by malware apps are seldom used by benign apps. 
Malware families use a particular set of permissions and intents targeting 
specific capabilities and resources. Almost all the malware samples 
belonging to that particular family use a unique set of permissions and 
intents. This study resulted in some very interesting findings which are 
discussed in this section.  
3.3.1   Permission usage by the Applications 
Most famous benign apps like Facebook, YouTube, Skype and 
Viber tend to use on average 8-16 permissions while this number goes 
down to 3-6 for the least famous applications. Some trend prevails in 
malware apps- most harmful malware apps use on average more than 16 
permissions and least harmful use 3-6 permissions as depicted in Figure 
3.3. 
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Figure 3.3.  Number of permissions used by the benign and malware apps. 
3.3.2   Permission Groups 
There are 35 permissions out of a total of 145 which are frequently 
used by apps, whereas remaining 110 are hardly ever used. We can group 
the repeatedly used permissions into normal and dangerous categories 
depending on their usage and associated risk levels. Examples of 
frequently used permissions by benign apps are Full Network access, 
Create/Add/remove/user accounts, Delete/Modify USB contents, 
Read/write/modify contacts. Malware apps prefer using Read phone status 
& ID, Access Network state, Send SMS/MMS, Receive boot complete, 
Receive SMS, Delete/Modify USB contents, your locations permissions 
etc.  
There are a few permissions, which are scarcely used by benign 
apps but frequently by malware apps e.g., Access Network state, Receive 
boot complete, Restart packages, Mount/Unmount File system, Set 
wallpapers, Read/write history bookmarks of browser, Write APN settings. 
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Set wallpapers permission is frequently used by adware to display 
coupons and ads for malicious or marketing websites whether user want 
them to or not. These ads promote the installation of additional unwanted 
contents such as browser extensions or optimization utilities and to 
generate pay-per-click revenue for the originator.  
3.3.3     Intent usage by the Applications 
Intent is a message passing system which is used to link            
components of same or different applications [103]. Applications with the 
same user ID could invoke functionalities of each other without declaring 
permissions individually for those functionalities thus gaining extra 
privileges. We categorize malware apps into most harmful and least 
harmful apps depending on the ease of access to sensitive resources and 
data regarding used permissions and intents. The most harmful malicious 
apps are those who are accessing more sensitive resources and data and 
may provide monetary damages to the users like sending premium rate 
SMSs, making calls, and accessing bank accounts details. The least 
dangerous malicious apps are those who can access some useful data 
and resources, but they may not cause financial or serious damage to the 
user or device.  
Most famous benign apps tend to use on average 1-3 intents, the 
least famous apps use 1-2. Most harmful malware use min 3 intents while 
this number goes up to 7. Least harmful malware apps witnessed to use at 
least 2 or 3 intents as depicted in Figure 3.5. Benign apps are seen to use 
only ACTION_MAIN, CATEGORY_LAUNCHER and 
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CATEGORY_DEFAULT intents whereas malware apps are tending toward 
adding more intent to gain extra capabilities. Most common intents used 
by the malware apps are ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED, ACTION_CALL, 
ACTION_BATTERY_LOW, ACTION_SMS_RECIEVE and 
ACTION_NEW_OUTGOING_CALL. 
 
Figure 3.5 Number of intents used by the benign and malware apps. 
3.3.4   Combining Permissions and Intents for Malware detection 
Android apps are exhibiting a consistent usage pattern of 
permissions and intents. Figure 3.6 gives an overall trend of how android 
apps are using these attributes in a clearly distinguishable manner. Real 
malware apps are corroborated to use few of the normal permissions and 
intents whilst they use a greater number of dangerous permissions and 
intents. Benign apps have shown a similar trend of using only normal 
permissions and intents, whereas the grey ware are those benign apps 
which are using unnecessary permissions along with the normal 
permissions and intents, to expand their modus operandi. 
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Figure 3.6 Permissions and intents usage pattern by Android apps. 
3.4 Correlation between permissions and intents 
A Correlation is a statistical technique that is used to measure and 
describe the strength and direction of the relationship between two 
variables. Different correlation coefficient methods: Pearson correlation 
coefficient, Intra-class correlation and Rank correlation. Correlation is 
defined as a single number known as correlation coefficient that quantifies 
a type of correlation and dependence, meaning statistical relationships 
between two or more values in fundamental statistics . We used Pearson 
correlation coefficient to find the statistical correlation between 
permissions and intents since it is widely used and more reliable method 
for the purpose. 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, also known as r, R, 
or Pearson's r, a measure of the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables that is defined as the (sample) 
covariance of the variables divided by the product of their (sample) 
standard deviations. The most common is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient that is a statistical measure of the strength of a linear 
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relationship between two variables. It is denoted by “r" and is calculated by 
dividing the covariance of two variables with product of their standard 
deviations. Pearson's correlation coefficient has a value between -1 
(perfect negative correlation) and 1 (perfect positive correlation) [104].  
Suppose we have n malware applications, each application is using 
X dangerous permissions written as xi  = {x1, x2,..., xn} and Y dangerous 
intents such that yi = {y1, y2,..., yn}, then the Pearson correlation coefficient 
(r) can be calculated using equation (3.1). 
 
Two sets of malware apps are used to measure the strength of 
correlation between dangerous permissions and dangerous intents. One 
set consists of 200 malware apps which are randomly selected from 
different malware families and the other consists of 20 malware apps from 
same malware family. 
 
For the first set, the correlation coefficient (r) equals 0.74, indicating 
a strong relationship between dangerous permissions and dangerous 
intents for the significance level: p < 0.001. For the other set, the 
correlation coefficient (r) equals to 0.94, indicating a very strong correlation 
between dangerous permissions and intents in the case of samples 
belonging to the same malware family. The strong correlation between the 
dangerous permissions and intents supports our conjecture about the 
(3.1) 
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association between permissions and intents to carry out the malicious 
activity. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.74 for different malware 
families and 0.94 for same malware family confirm the positive correlation 
between permissions and intents. However, we need to perform a 
significance test to decide whether or not there is any evidence which 
supports or contradicts the presence of a linear correlation in the whole 
population of malware apps. We use the hypothesis testing, for which we 
test the null hypothesis, H0, and alternate hypothesis, H1 as 
H0 : malware and benign applications use the same  
        set of permissions and intents, 
H1 : malware and benign applications don’t use the 
       same set of permissions and intents. 
 
For hypothesis testing, we use the Mann-Whitney U test with the 
p-value of 0.05. We calculate U1 and U2 values for both the permissions 
and intents respectively using equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. In 
following equations, R1 and R2 are the sums of ranks for permissions and 
intents, respectively, and n1 and n2 are the sample sizes for both the 
variables. 
;
2
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We take the smallest of U and compare it with the critical value 
obtained from the Mann-Whitney critical values table [105]. We use Mann-
Whitney critical values table for a small number of malware samples and 
Z-test for large samples of malware apps due to limitations of the number 
of entries in the Mann-Whitney critical value table. With samples from 
same malware family (n1= 20, n2 = 19, p=0.05, critical value = 119), the 
smallest U value obtained is 87 which is less than the critical value of 119, 
we would reject the null hypothesis for the malware apps belonging to 
same family. For a large sample of apps belonging to different malware 
families (n1 = n2 = 200, p=0.05, Z-critical value = 1.64), we calculate z-
score with Z test. We obtain z-score of 13.0594 which is greater than Z-
critical value hence suggesting the rejection of null hypothesis H0. We 
have very strong statistical evidence to accept the alternate hypothesis 
H1, which suggests that the malware and benign apps use a different set 
of permissions and intents. This conjecture is further verified with 
classification analysis using different machine learning algorithms. 
3.5 AndroPIn: Malware Detection Algorithm 
In this section, we present an automated malware detection 
algorithm: AndroPIn which is based on identification of distinct usage 
pattern of permissions and intents declared in the manifest file. Once 
declared, these vital features cannot be altered by code obfuscation or 
encryption. AndroPIn is an implementation of the methodology proposed in 
Chapter 4 and validating the effectiveness of algorithm for detection of 
malware apps including the obfuscated ones. It extracts the permissions 
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and intents of an app and classifies it as malicious or benign by comparing 
against certain combinations of permissions and intents. These 
combinations form a distinct usage pattern of malicious apps which 
distinguishes them from the benign apps. These features, which play a 
major role in sharing user data and device resources cannot be 
obfuscated or altered. These vital features are well suited for resource 
constrained smartphones. Experimental evaluation on a corpus of real-
world malware and benign apps demonstrate that the proposed algorithm 
can effectively detect malicious apps with low run-time overheads and is 
resilient to common obfuscations methods.  
3.5.1   Design 
A malware detection system for Android can be architected in a 
variety of ways. It could be designed as a complete client based anti -
malware scanner app or a client and server based solution to efficiently 
process the analysis and classification of malware apps. A complete client 
based solution would have to overcome a number of challenges for 
efficiently and accurately detecting the malware apps. We develop our 
solution using client and server architecture which is efficient and accurate 
since it does not rely on the limited resources of mobile phones. The 
client-server architecture further has multiple choices to select for the 
implementation of different tasks either on server or on client. Such sub 
tasks include extraction of features, comparison of learned behaviour 
against the normal or malicious etc.  We studied different design options 
and discuss here the selected one in which we use server for the analysis 
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and detection processes to gain efficiency. However, it is possible to 
design the whole architecture on the phone at a little bit cost of efficiency.  
The work flow of AndroPIn is shown in Fig. 3.7. It consists of three 
main stages: Feature extraction, Detection engine and data logger / 
reporter. First of all the apk file is decompiled and the required features: 
permissions and intents of an app are extracted and stored in a separate 
file for analysis.   
 
Permissions
Intents
Feature Extraction
Permission 
Monitor
Intents 
Monitor
Detection Engine
Malicious 
Permissions and 
intents
Database
Malicious 
Permissions and 
intents
Yes
No
Malicious 
Thresholds
Data 
Logger / 
Reporter
Yes
User notification{}
Suspected 
App
 Fig. 3.7: AndroPIn architecture  
The analysis/detection engine consists of two steps: In first step, 
the extracted features of a suspected app are checked against the pre -
defined template T, which consists of four arrays of malicious permissions, 
normal permissions, malicious intents and normal intents. Second step 
involves the testing against the malicious threshold. If the app is within the 
malicious threshold, it is labelled as malware. Third stage is the data 
logger and reporter which makes logs of results and generates 
notifications for the user. 
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3.5.2 Implementation 
We present an algorithm for checking whether an app is malware or 
benign. We have implemented our algorithm as a malware detection tool. 
The proposed algorithm consists of two phases: identifying the malicious 
permissions and intents (Algorithm 1) and classifying the app as either 
malware or benign (Algorithm 2).  
The crux of AndroPIn is the component responsible for classifying 
an application's behaviour as either benign or malicious. We use 
Androguard1 tool to extract permissions and intents of an app from its 
AndroidManifest.xml file. Androguard is a python based reverse 
engineering tool, which can run on Linux/Windows/OSX. It is used to 
disassemble and to decompile android apps and to statically analyse 
apps. The Androguard’s commands get_permissions() and get_intents() 
lists the permissions and intents declared by an app. After extracting the 
permissions, the program automatically saves the information in a 
temporary output file: ‘output3.txt’.  We use Python to develop the 
algorithm, which first defines the malicious and normal feature set in the 
algo.py file (Algorithm 1). There are four arrays, each defining the 
malicious permissions, normal permissions, malicious intents and normal 
intents. Permissions and intents of suspected app saved in ‘output3.txt’ 
are compared against the four arrays. If the under test app contains the 
malicious permissions and malicious intents, these are printed on the 
screen as shown in Fig.3.8. 
1 https://github.com/androguard/androguard 
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      Algorithm 1: Identification of Malicious permissions and intents 
 
  
       Input :   List of malicious permissions,  
           List of normal permissions, 
           List of malicious intents, 
           List of normal intents 
      Output : List of malicious and normal permissions & intents of suspected app 
 
       1:      apk                            > an incoming app 
       2:      Malicious_Permission [n1]: = List of n1 malicious permissions 
       3:      Normal_Permission [n2 ]: = List of n2 normal permissions 
       4:      Malicious_Intent [n3 ]: = List of n3 malicious intents 
       5:      Normal_Intent [ n4]: = List of n4 normal intents 
       6:      Create an object O of the APK class for Suspected_Malware.apk 
       7:      Call O. get_android_manifest_xml() to generate AndroidManifest.xml   
       8:               for i: = 1 to n1 
       9:              if (Malicious_Permission [i] exist in 
AndroidManifest.xml)  
       10:                                     Print Malicious_Permission [i] 
       11:           end if 
       12: end for 
       13:   for i: = 1 to n2 
       14:            if (Normal_Permission [i] exist in 
AndroidManifest.xml) 
       15:                                     Print Normal_Permission [i] 
       16:           end if 
       17: end for 
       18:           for i: = 1 to n3 
       19:            if (Malicious_Intent[i] exist in AndroidManifest.xml)  
       20:                                     Print Malicious_Intent [i] 
       21:           end if 
       22:         end for 
       23:           for i: = 1 to n4 
       24:             if (Normal_Intents [i] exist in AndroidManifest.xml)   
       25:                                     Print Normal_Intent [i] 
       26:                       end if 
       27:          end for 
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Fig. 3.8: Matched permissions and intents 
The malware detection Algorithm 2 is responsible for classifying an 
application's behaviour as either benign or malicious. If the Algorithm 1 
confirms the presence of malicious permissions and malicious intents in 
the under test app, Algorithm 2 verifies against the thresholds of 
maliciousness to avoid the false positives. If the app falls into the malicious 
criteria then it is labelled as malware and user is notified.  
  
 Algorithm 2  Malware Detection Process    
  
LEGEND: 
          MP: Malicious_ Permissions  
          NP: Normal_Permissions 
           MI : Malicious_Intents 
           NI  : Normal_ Intents 
 
           Input:  Malicious_ Permissions[i] 
                       Normal_Permissions[i] 
                       Malicious_Intents[i] 
                       Normal_ Intents[i] 
           Output: Malware notification 
 
      1:   Scan for (Malicious_ Permissions[i],  Normal_Permissions[i],          
Malicious_Intents[i], Normal_ Intents[i]) 
      2:   if (MP >= 1 && MI >= 1) //Filter malicious permissions and malicious intents 
      3:       then 
      4:               if (MP + + NP = = 3) && (MI + + NI >=1) 
      5:                    Print  Malware detected  
      6:       else         
      7:                          Print  Goodware detected 
      8:   end if 
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3.6  EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS 
We evaluate our implementation of algorithm against real world 
malware and benign apps. The experiments aimed to validate the 
effectiveness of algorithm for detection of malware apps including the 
obfuscated ones with a low false positive rate. 
3.6.1 Experimental Setup 
  The experiments are carried out on an Intel Core i7-3520 M CPU @ 
2.90 GHz, 2901 MHz machine with 8GB RAM. Machine was configured 
with different Android reverse engineering tools. Androguard can be run on 
terminal by directly downloading from the project website or it can be run 
on Virtual machine environments such as Santoku or Android Reverse 
Engineering (A.R.E) virtual machines. Both of these VMs are installed with 
all modules required to run Androguard. We use Santoku VM due to its 
preference by the Androguard creators. Santoku is a dedicated to mobile 
forensics, analysis, and security. It is a Linux distribution. We download 
the full pack of Virtual machine with all modules required to run the tool 
and installed with default settings. First step is to create a new virtual 
machine to carry out our analysis as shown in Fig. 3.9. Then the 
configurations of resources for the VM are done as shown in Figures 3.10 
and 3.11 respectively. 
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Fig. 3.9 AndroPIn: creation of new VM 
 
 
Fig. 3.10 AndroPIn: configuration of new VM 
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Fig. 3.11: AndroPIn: configuration of new VM continued 
Once the VM is created, starting the machine will display the main 
analysis environment as shown in Fig. 3.12. 
 
Fig. 3.12: Analysis of app 
Clicking on the Knife and going to accessories to open the 
LXTerminal as shown in Fig. 3.13. With the following command we start 
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the Androguard in our VM: 
        cd /usr/share/androguard 
 
Fig. 3.13:   Calling the Androguard  
Using the file manager (next to the Knife icon) and starting the 
/usr/share/androguard for placing the algorithm file: test.py in that directory 
as shown in Fig. 3.14.   
 
Fig. 3.14: AndroPIn algorithm in VM 
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Once the algorithm file is setup in the environment, the apk files are 
verified as shown Fig. 3.15.  
 
Fig. 3.15: Analysis results 
3.6.2 Dataset 
A total of 145 malware and 125 benign apps are verified with the 
algorithm which is collected from well-known sources described in Chapter 
3. These samples are rigorously selected from known malware families 
and different categories of benign apps. Details of samples from the 
malware families and benign categories are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Details of Malware samples with obfuscation 
Malware 
Family 
No of 
samples 
Malware 
Family 
No of 
samples 
Basebridge 5  DroidKungFu  5 
FakeDolphin   5 Locker  5 
VDLoader  5 FakeBank  5 
GinMaster  5 Boxer  5 
JIFake  5  SNDApps  5 
OpFake  5  FakeInst  5 
FakePlayer  5  BgServ  5 
Plankton  5 Geinimi  5 
AnserverBot  5 PjApps  5 
GoldDream  5  DroidSheep  3 
CopyCat  3 DroidDream  5 
DroidKungFu  5  Keji  3 
HolyBible  3  Obad  2 
Nickispbby  2  RuFraud  3 
Jsmshider  3  Zitmo  3 
AngryBird  5  KMin  5 
DroidKungFua  3 DroidKungFuaa  2 
Table 3.3: Categories of benign apps 
Category No of 
samples 
Category No of 
samples 
Social Media 5  Mail  5 
Education   5 Banking  5 
Entertainment  5 Sports  5 
Shopping  5 Finance  5 
News  5  Weather  5 
Games  5  Medical  5 
Fitness  5  Media  5 
Casual  5 Music  5 
Books  5 Travel  5 
Lifestyle  5  Simulation  5 
Transportation  3 Misc 20 
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3.6.3 Results and Performance Analysis 
The detection results are shown in Table 3.4. The TPR of 0.98 and 
FPR of 0.02 are achieved with the experimental dataset. These results can 
further be improved with optimization of algorithm. 
Table 3.4: Performance Results 
Method TPR FPR 
AndroPIn 0.98 0.02 
 
3.7 Summary 
Android security framework relies on permissions and intents to 
control the access to vital hardware and software resources. These two 
features have never been used in tandem for malware detection. In this 
paper, we proposed Andropin, a novel and efficient malware detection 
algorithm based on these two vital security features, which was evaluated 
on real world malicious and benign apps. Malware samples selected for 
the experiments represent different types of malicious families with 
diversified real-world threats. The experiment results demonstrate that the 
proposed algorithm can accurately detect malware apps. We also evince 
with experiments that the proposed algorithm is particularly effective for 
detection of obfuscated malware apps due to its reliance on the 
unalterable features. Our future work aims to optimize the algorithm to 
improve on the false positive rate and validation on larger malware 
dataset. 
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Chapter 4 
PInDroid: Permissions and Intents based 
Malware detection  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we discuss our methodology of PInDroid, which is 
built on the study presented in Chapter 3.  Since malware use more 
sophisticated obfuscation and evasion techniques, it is provident to use 
the obfuscation resilient methods and features for malware detection. For 
this reason, PInDroid uses those features of manifest file, which are 
resilient to code obfuscation and there is no complexity involved in 
extraction of these features. The selected features are the basic essence 
of any Android app; without these features apps cannot do any good or 
bad or things.  
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Permissions are a vital security mechanism which guards against 
the misuse of hardware and software resources [106]; however, it relies on 
the user’s decision to accept the permissions of an app and other built-in 
features mainly the intents deprecate such security protections. Most 
malware need to use some permission to achieve their malicious goals 
which they must declare in the Manifest file and ask the users for 
approving the permissions before installation of app. Similarly, malware 
apps use intents to carry out malicious actions which they must declare in 
the Manifest file but do not ask the users for approval. This design flaw on 
Android is exploited by malware apps to carry out stealthy malicious 
actions. Intents have extended a number of known and unknown 
legitimate covert channels to malware app. Although, a significant 
research is done on permissions and API calls for detection of malware, 
however, intents remained almost untouched before starting this research 
work. There was no published works where intent was used as a key 
feature for detection of malware at the start of PhD research in 2013.  
Our research on permissions and intents led us to a feature set that 
helps in accurately detecting malicious apps. After separately investigating 
the potentials of permissions and intents in detecting the maliciousness of 
apps, the author combined these two features to study their effectiveness 
in pinpointing the possible risky behaviours of apps. We argue that since 
many of the stealthy malicious actions are not possible without combining 
the permissions and intents by the malware developers, thus many of the 
malware apps cannot be detected without combining these features. Our 
experiments strongly validate our heuristics.  
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents 
the overview of the methodology which includes the system architecture, 
samples dataset, reverse engineering techniques used to analyse the 
apps, extraction of features and pre-processing, building the classification 
models using different ML algorithms, comparison of performance of these 
algorithms on the dataset and feature set. Section 4.3 discusses the 
experimental setup and Section 4.4 presents the results. Section 4.5 
compares the approach with the related state-of-the-art approaches. 
Section 4.6 discusses the application of ensemble learning methods and 
Section 4.7 summarizes the chapter. 
4.2 Overview  
The aim of this work is to validate a set of simple and effective 
features which should be easily extracted, applied and combined to 
classify the malware apps. Different machine learning algorithms and ML 
based malware detection approaches [64, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148 and 149] are investigated for 
classification of malicious apps. The work flow of this methodology is 
divided into two phases: training and testing. In the training phase, a set of 
features (Permissions and Intents) are extracted from the manifest files of 
a large sample of malware and benign apps. The extracted features are 
represented in a vector format executable by the data mining software 
Weka1. Our goal is to build a model which can distinguish malware from  
1Weka, http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
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benign applications efficiently based on Android permissions and intents.  
Six machine learning classifiers: Naive Bayesian, Decision Tree, 
Decision Table, Random Forest, Sequential Minimal Optimization and 
Multi-lateral Perceptron (MLP) are trained with the datasets to build 
classification models.  
In the testing phase, the same set of features is extracted from a 
sample of benign and malware to be tested and classified by the learned 
models from the training phase. Performance of ML algorithms is validated 
against various performance measures.  
4.2.1 System Architecture 
The system architecture is shown in the Figure 4.1. It consists of 
four main stages: Apk de-compilation, Feature extraction, Pre-processing, 
and Classification. The first stage is for decompiling of target app to get 
AndroidManiFest.xml. The second stage analyses the manifest file and 
extracts the permissions and intents. This stage comprises of two monitors 
that are used to measure: (i) type of permissions (normal or dangerous) 
and their numbers and, (ii) type of intents (normal or dangerous) and their 
number. Permissions and intents are labelled  into four groups: normal 
permissions, normal intents, dangerous permissions and dangerous 
intents. Dangerous permissions and intents are frequently used by 
malware apps whilst normal permissions and intents are frequently used 
by benign apps. The pre-processor stage transforms the extracted 
features from each app into vector dataset in an ARFF fi le format that can 
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be applicable for machine learning algorithms. Each app is represented as 
a single instance with discrete vector of features and a class label 
indicating whether the app is benign or malicious. The generated dataset 
is randomized using unsupervised instance randomization fi lter for better 
accuracy and sent to the classifier stage. The last stage is for the 
classification of app as either malware or benign. The classifier is trained 
with the known samples and the learned models are used to detect 
whether a given app is malicious or benign. The classifier takes each 
vector as input and classifies the data set using trained classifier. Finally, 
the reporter stage generates notifications for the user based on the 
classifier results. 
Details of implementation, datasets, used tools, main features of 
interest, and the ML algorithms are given in subsequent paragraphs. 
Permissions
Intents
PInDroid
Yes Data 
Logger / 
Reporter
Malware/
Benign
User notification{}
Suspected 
App
Pre-
processor
Classifier
Feature Extraction
Permission 
Monitor
Intents 
Monitor
Figure 4.1: Diagram of proposed system 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
A total of 1300 malware and 445 benign apps were analysed, which 
are collected from well-known sources such as Google Play store1, 
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Contagiodump2, Genome3, Virus Total4, theZoo5, MalShare6, and 
VirusShare7. Samples were selected to ensure that the dataset represent 
the behaviour of broad categories of benign apps and families of malware 
apps. Table 4.1 depicts the details of malware samples collected from 
each source. These sources contain the datasets of already known 
malware samples. Maliciousness of these samples is also confirmed with 
Virus Total service integrated with ten detection engines. We labelled the 
app as malware, if it was detected as malicious by two of the engines. 
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-1) of files were also checked with a tool: 
HashTab8 to ascertain the uniqueness of samples. Details of known 
malware families, their malicious activities and number of analysed 
samples from each family are shown in Table 4.2. 
To validate our method, we also downloaded 445 benign apps from 
known app stores such as Google Play, AppBrain9, F-Droid10, Getjar11, 
Aptoid12, and Mobango13. The benign apps are selected from different 
categories such as social, news, entertainment, finance, education, 
games, sports, music, and audio, telephony, messaging, shopping, 
banking and weather to learn the normal behaviour of benign apps. Table  
1Google Play, Web: https://play.google.com/store?hl=en 
2Contagio Mobile: mobile malware mini dump, 
Web:http://contagiominidump.blogspot.co.uk/ 
3Android Malware Genome Project, Web: http://www.malgenomeproject.org/  
4VirusTotal for Android,Web: https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/mobile - 
applications/ 
5theZoo aka Malware DB, Web: http://ytisf.github.io/theZoo/ 
6MalShare project, Web: http://malshare.com/about.php 
7Web: https://virusshare.com/ 
8HashTab, Web: http://implbits.com/products/hashtab/ 
9Web: http://www.appbrain.com/ 
10Web: https://f-droid.org/ 
11Web: http://www.getjar.com/ 
12Web: https://www.aptoide.com/ 
13Web: http://www.mobango.com/ 
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4.3 depict the details of categories of benign apps, number of analysed 
apps from each category and the corresponding app stores.  
Table 4.1: List of Malware samples 
Malware family  No of 
samples  
Malware type 
Basebridge  11 Botnet, Information stealing 
DroidKungFu  11 Botnet, Information stealing 
DroidKungFu  10 Botnet, Information stealing, Backdoor 
FakeDolphin  4 Adware 
Locker  2 Ransomware 
VDLoader  3 Backdoor, Information stealing 
FakeBank  5 Trojan Banker, Money stealing, 
Information stealing 
GinMaster  7 Information stealing, Backdoor 
Boxer  2 Sends SMS 
JIFake  3 Sends SMS 
SNDApps  1 Information stealing 
OpFake  4 Sends SMS 
FakeInst  
 
3 Installer 
FakePlayer  3 Sends SMS 
BgServ  
 
7 Botnet, Information stealing, Trojan 
Installer, backdoor 
Plankton  7 Money stealing, Botnet, Information 
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 stealing, Backdoor, Trojan installer 
Geinimi  9 Botnet, Information stealing, Root 
access 
AnserverBot  13 Information stealing 
PjApps  9 Botnet, backdoor 
GoldDream  
 
10 Trojan, Information stealing 
DroidSheep  7 Session hijacker 
CopyCat  
 
4 Adware 
DroidDream  
 
10 Information stealing, Adware 
DroidKungFu  
 
11 Botnet, Information stealing, Root 
access 
Keji  
 
4 Information stealing, Trojan Installer 
HolyBible  
 
5 Adware, Backdoor 
Obad  
 
2 Botnet, Information stealing, Botnet, 
Trojan Installer, backdoor, SMS, 
Location 
Nickispbby  
 
5 Spying, Information stealing 
RuFraud  
 
3 SMS sending 
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Jsmshider  
 
3 Information stealing 
Zitmo  
 
3 Money, Information stealing, Backdoor 
AngryBird  
 
13 Botnet, Information stealing 
KMin  10 Exploit, Information stealing 
 
Table 4.2: Sources of malware samples 
Source No of malware 
samples 
Contagio 60 
Drebin 100 
Genome 1000 
Virus Total 70 
theZoo 20 
MalShare 25 
VirusShare 25 
 
Table 4.3: Categories and sources of benign samples  
Category No of samples App Market 
Social Media 11 Google Play store 
Mail 4 Google Play store 
Education 10 Google Play store 
Banking 4 Google Play store 
Entertainment 15 Google Play store 
Sports 8 Google Play store 
     8 Google Play store 
Weather 8 Google Play store 
Games 15 Google Play store 
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Weather 8 Google Play store 
Games 15 Google Play store 
Medical 10 Google Play store 
Fitness 11 Google Play store 
      11 Google Play store 
Casual 15 Google Play store 
Music 15 Google Play store 
Books 5 Google Play store 
Travel 5 Google Play store 
Lifestyle 15 Google Play store 
Simulations 7 Google Play store 
Misc 15 AppBrain 
Misc 10 F-Droid 
Misc 10 Getjar 
Misc 15 Aptoid 
Misc 15 Mobango 
4.2.3 Feature Extraction 
The collected samples are apk files that were analysed and 
transformed into the format suitable for the Machine learning algorithms. 
Each apk file is decompressed to extract the manifest file, which is 
investigated to for the desired features: permissions and intents. The 
extracted features are then processed to build a dataset in an ARFF file 
format. Each instance of dataset represents either a malware or benign 
app.  Feature datasets and examples of feature vector set are shown in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. 
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Table 4,4: Selected features 
Features Category Sub Features 
 
 
Permissions 
Normal 
Permissions 
 
WRITE_SETTINGS 
CREATE ACCOUNTS 
ADD ACCOUNTS 
REMOVE ACCOUNTS 
USE ACCOUNTS 
SET PASSWORDS 
 
 
 
 
 
Dangerous 
Permissions 
INTERNET 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
SEND_SMS 
INSTALL PACKAGES 
RECEIVE _SMS 
WRITE_SMS 
READ_SMS 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEM 
 
Intents 
Dangerous 
Intent 
 
BOOT_COMPLETED 
SMS_RECEIVED 
PHONE_STATE 
NEW_OUTGOING_CALLS 
UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT 
HOME 
Normal 
Intent 
 
MAIN 
LAUNCH 
VIEW 
BROWSABLE 
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Table 4.5: Examples of features Vector set 
 
Normal 
Permission 
Normal 
Intent 
Dangerous 
Permission 
Dangerous 
Intent 
Classification 
1 
10 
9 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
0 
2 
1 
0 
3 
2 
0 
0 
7 
2 
1 
11 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
1 
4 
0 
1 
Malware 
Benign 
Benign 
Benign 
Malware 
Benign 
Benign 
Malware 
Benign 
Benign 
4.3 Experimental Settings 
The experiments were carried out on an Intel Core i7-3520 M CPU @ 
2.90 GHz, 2901 MHz machine with 8GB RAM. Machine was configured 
with different machine learning algorithms (WEKA software), Android 
development and testing modules, apk file parser as well as some open 
source analysis tools. Each of the classifiers is evaluated with the 10-fold 
cross-validation method. In 10-fold cross-validation, the data is divided into 
ten subsets, and the method is repeated ten times. In each round, one 
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subset is taken as test set and the remaining nine subsets are combined 
to form the training set. Errors of all the ten rounds are averaged out to 
obtain a final output. This method ensures that each instance is included 
at least once in the test set and nine times in the training set. The final 
model is the average of all ten iterations. Basically, we applied the 
classifier to data 10 times and every time with 90:10 ratios (90% for 
training and 10% for testing). The final model is the average of all 10 
iterations as depicted in Figure 4.2.  
Original Dataset
Random 
stratified data 
in 10 folds
ITER = 1
Evaluation on 
testing dataset
Increment 
ITER
Testing Dataset
(fold at ITER)
Training dataset
(remaining 9 folds)
 Rank Modelling on 
training dataset
ITER<10
 
Figure 4.2: Flowchart for 10-fold experiments 
4.3.1 ML Classifiers  
Performance of the following six ML classifiers is compared against 
different measures.  
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(i) Naive Bayesian 
(ii) Decision Tree (J48) 
(iii) SMO 
(iv) Random Forest 
(v) Neural Networks Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) 
(vi) Decision Table (DT) 
(i) Naïve Bayesian 
 It is a conditional probabilistic classifier based on Bayes’ 
theorem with an assumption of independence between the features 
to predict the class. A Naive Bayes classifier assumes that the 
presence of a particular feature in a class is unrelated to the 
presence of any other feature. Naive Bayesian model is easy to build 
and particularly useful for very large data sets. It provides a way of 
calculating posterior probability P (c|x) from P (c), P (x) and P (x|c) 1.  
   Prior P(c) x Likelihood P(x) 
Posterior (P (c|x) =                              (3.4) 
      Evidence P (x|c) 
(ii) Decision Tree 
Decision tree uses a decision tree predictive model to go from 
observations about an item (represented in the branches) to 
conclusions about the item's target value (represented in the leaves). 
In classification trees (the target variable can take a discrete set of  
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_Bayes_classifier 
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values) leaves represent class labels and branches represent 
conjunctions of features that lead to those class labels2.  
(iii) Sequential minimal optimization (SMO) 
SMO is an algorithm for solving the quadratic programming 
(QP) problem that arises during the training of support vector 
machines. SMO is widely used for training support vector machines 
and is implemented by the popular LIBSVM tool that is simpler than 
the previously available methods for SVM training and it required 
expensive third-party QP solvers3. 
(iv)    Random Forest 
Random forests is an ensemble learning method for 
classification that constructs multitude of decision trees at training 
time and outputting the class that is the mode of the classes 
(classification) of the individual trees. Random decision forests 
correct for decision trees' habit of over fitting to their training set 4. 
 (v) MLP 
MLP is an artificial neural network algorithm consisting of at 
least three layers of nodes. Except for the input nodes, each node is 
a neuron that uses a nonlinear activation function. It is s multiple 
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision _Tree 
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sequential_Minimal_Optimization 
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_Forest 
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layers and non-linear activation distinguish MLP from a linear 
perceptron. It can distinguish data that is not linearly separable5. 
 (vi Decision Table 
 Decision tables are a visual representation for specifying which 
actions to perform depending on given conditions. They are 
algorithms whose output is a set of actions. The information 
expressed in decision tables could also be represented as decision 
trees or in a programming language as a series of if-then-else and 
switch-case statements. Each decision corresponds to a variable, 
relation or predicate whose possible values are listed among the 
condition alternatives. Each action is a procedure or operation to 
perform, and the entries specify whether (or in what order) the action 
is to be performed for the set of condition alternatives the entry 
corresponds to6. 
4.3.2 Performance Comparison of ML Classifiers 
Performance of the six classifiers is compared in terms of True 
Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), accuracy, F1-score and 
Area Under Curve (AUC). These metrics are calculated using the 
confusion matrix as shown in Table 4.6.  
 
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilayer_Perceptron 
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_table 
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Table 4.6 is generated from the four measures: True Positive  (TP) - 
the number of correctly classified instances that belong to the class, True 
Negative (TN) - the number of correctly classified class instances that do 
not belong to the class, False Positive (FP) - instances which were 
incorrectly classified as belonging to the class and False Negative (FN) - 
instances which were not classified as class instances.  
                                      ;=
FNTP
TP
TPR

                                                                             (3.5) 
               ;=
TNFPFNTP
TNTP
FPR

                                                           (3.6) 
                                    ;=
TNFPFNTP
TNTP
Accuracy

                                                (3.7) 
             ;
.
2.=1
RecallPrecision
RecallPrecision
ScoreF

                                            (3.8) 
 
Table 4.6: Confusion Matrix 
Actual Class Classified as 
Malware 
Classified as 
Benign 
Malware TP FN 
Benign FP TN 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 4.7 lists the TPR, FPR, Precision, F1-score, recall, AUC and 
processing time. All the analysed classifiers perform well with an accuracy 
of 0.90 or more. However, MLP and Decision table dominate with an 
accuracy of 0.993. In terms of time, Nave Bayesian, Decision Tree and 
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Decision Table are more efficient than MLP and Random forest. Overall, 
Decision Table produces the best results. 
4.4.1 Performance Comparison of different Classifiers 
Performance of the six widely used classifiers is compared in terms 
of TPR, FPR, Precision, recall, AUC and time taken to bui ld the model. 
Table 4.7 lists the results obtained for TPR, FPR, Precision and recall. 
Decision Table outperformed all classifiers in detecting the correct class of 
malware applications with an accuracy of 99.3% whilst SMO performs 
worst in terms of measured parameters. 
Table 4.7: Comparison of classification algorithms  
 
Algorithm  
 
TPR  
 
FPR 
 
Precision 
 
Recall 
 
Time  
Decision Table  0.993 0.006 0.99 0.99 0.23 
MLP  0.992  0.008 0.99 0.99 1.18 
Decision Tree  0.9861 0.011 0.98 0.98 1.24 
Nave Bayesian  0.982 0.012 0.98 0.98 0.95 
Random Forest  0.97 0.07   0.97  0.97  0.43 
SMO   0.67  0.033    0.67  0.67    0.94 
 
Additionally, the classifiers are evaluated in terms of time taken to 
build up the model. The Decision Table takes less time than all other 
classifiers. Overall, results demonstrate that the Decision Table is efficient 
and accurate classifier as compared to other five algorithms.  
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4.4.2  Area Under Curve (AUC) 
Accuracy of detection is measured by the area under the curve. An 
area of 1 represents a perfect detection; an area of 0.5 represents a worst 
detection. Traditionally accepted values1 for AUC are shown below:- 
 0.90-1 = excellent (A) 
 0.80-0.90 = good (B) 
 0.70-0.80 = fair (C) 
 0.60-0.70 = poor (D) 
 0.50-0.60 = fail (F) 
Table 4.8 depicts the AUC values obtained with different classifiers. 
Decision Table, Decision Tree and MLP have “Excellent” AUC values 
compared to Random Forest and Naïve Bayesian which have “Good” 
AUC values. SMO’s performance performs poorly of all the classifiers.  
Table 4.8 AUC comparison of classifiers 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1https://sonoworld.com/fetus/page.aspx?id=1698 
Classifier AUC 
Decision Table 99% 
Decision Tree 98% 
MLP 98% 
Random Forest 89% 
Naïve Bayesian 87% 
SMO 50% 
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4.5 Comparison with related approaches 
We compare the performance of PIndroid against relevant 
approaches which use some of the similar features and analysing the 
samples acquired from same sources: Google Playstore, Genome and 
Contagiodump. These are known repositories of malware and benign apps 
and the performance of most of the state of the art malware detection 
approaches are tested on these samples with a difference of number of 
samples tested. The most relevant approaches are Drebin [154], DroidMat 
[155] and Marvin [156].   
 Drebin [154] examines the manifest file and decomposed code of 
app to check the permissions, API calls, hardware resources, app 
components, filtered intents and network addresses. It uses support vector 
machines (SVM) for malware classification. Although, they used the 
largest dataset of 129,013 apps, it consists only 4.5% of malware samples 
thereby may not be able to learn malware patterns. It used many features 
opposed to our work which uses only two most effective features. It 
achieved 94% malware detection rate with 0.01 false positive rate whereas 
our approach achieved 99% detection accuracy with 0.006 FPR. Drebin 
[154] requires extensive processing for extraction and execution of a large 
number of features from the manifest file and app code, it takes more time 
to analyse the app and therefore is less efficient than our method. It takes 
on average 10 seconds to analyse an app, whereas our approach takes 
less than 1 second. Its use of a large number of features may also result in 
more false alarms as the efficiency and accuracy of feature based 
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detection approaches highly depend on the selection of more relevant and 
less number of features. 
DroidMat [155] analyses some features from the manifest file and 
smali files of disassembled codes. The extracted features include 
permissions, components deployments, intent messages and API calls. It 
applies K-means algorithm for clustering and Singular Value 
Decomposition (SVD) method for low-rank approximation. The minimized 
clusters are processed with a kNN algorithm for classification into malware 
or benign apps. It achieves an accuracy of 97.6% with no reported false 
positive rate. They analysed 1738 apps consisting of 1500 benign and only 
238 malware samples. Malware samples are only 13% of total dataset, 
which is a non-representative data set for capturing the malware usage 
patterns. The accuracy is less than our method and the processing time is 
higher as it needs to perform the execution of smali files and manifest files. 
Since Smali files are much larger than manifest files, the overall cost of 
methods which analyse smali files forgoes higher. This holds true for 
Drebin [154] and DroidMat [155]. 
Marvin [156] uses off-device static and dynamic analysis for 
malware detection. It uses around 490,000 features extracted from the 
manifest fi les and disassembled codes. Its high-dimensional feature set 
includes permissions, intents, API calls, network statistics, components, 
file operations, phone events, app developer IDs, package serial numbers 
and bundles of other features. It uses a linear classifier to detect malware 
app and assign a malicious score to the app on a scale from 0 to 10, with 
0 being benign and 10 being malicious. They used the largest dataset of 
103 
 
150,000 apps in which only 10% are malware samples. It classifies with an 
accuracy of 98.24% and false positive rate of 0.04%. Although this 
approach classifies with the malicious score, this is not an efficient 
approach considering the high dimensionality of features and regular 
updating requirement of the database to maintain the detection 
performance. Since, both the analyses are done off-the-device; the mobile 
app is just to provide an interface to upload the apk to the analysis server. 
The static and dynamic analyses of an app take several minutes 
depending on the size of smali files. This approach is less efficient and 
less accurate than our approach.  
 We further compared the detection rate of PIndroid on the 
unlabelled set of 100 apps against these approaches. PInDroid 
significantly outperforms the other approaches with TPR of 0.98 and FPR 
of 0.1. The other approaches provide a detection rate between 0.90 to 
0.93 with FPR between 0.7 to 1. Detection performance of compared 
approaches is shown in Fig. 4.3.  
 
 Figure 4.3: Comparison with relevant approaches 
The compared approaches are less efficient than our approach in 
analysing the apps due to their dual processing time. PInDroid gives more 
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accurate results due to the use of most relevant feature set to model the 
malicious behaviour 
4.6 Application of Ensemble Learning Methods   
 In this section, a study on effect of applying different ensemble 
methods is presented.  The motivation to apply ensemble methods is to 
ascertain if the performance of poorly performing classifiers can be 
improved by applying ensemble techniques. If the predictions from each 
non-over fitting model are combined, then the final aggregated prediction 
will be less noisy than the single opinion of individual model and there will 
be no over fitting. We have used different ensemble methods such as 
boosting, bagging and stacking for combining multiple trained classification 
algorithms. The predictions from combined classifiers are processed with 
the help of well know ensemble schemes such as majority voting, average 
of probability and product of probability.  
4.6.1  Ensemble Learning  
Ensemble methods combine the results of multiple machine 
learning algorithms to improve the predictive performance [159, 160]. We 
use three ensemble methods namely Boosting, Bagging and Stacking to 
improve the detection results of classification algorithms.  
4.6.2 Boosting 
In boosting, a base classifier is trained on the training dataset 
followed by the subsequent stages of classifiers which concentrate on the 
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incorrectly classified instances by the previous classifier. Classifier stages 
are added till the time there is a limit in the number of models or accuracy 
[161, 162]. We use popular boosting meta-algorithm AdaBoost, introduced 
in 1995 by Freund and Schapire.  
4.6.3 Bootstrap Aggregating (Bagging) 
In bagging, the training dataset is sub-divided into multiple training 
datasets and each dataset is used to train a classifier as shown in Figure 
4.4. Finally, the outputs of all the classifiers are combined by averaging out 
or majority voting method [162].  
 
 
  Figure 4.4: Bagging Process  
4.6.4  Blending / Stacking 
 In stacking, multiple algorithms are trained individually with the 
training dataset and the outputs from the classifiers are sent to a meta -
Training Dataset
Training 
Sub-set-I
Training 
Sub-set-n
Training 
Sub-set-II
Sub Model I Sub Model nSub Model II
Results
Boostrap Sampling
ML Classifiers
Majority Voting Method
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classifier which combines the results of the base classifiers using any of 
the three schemes: an average of probabilities, a product of probabilities 
and majority voting (Figure 4.5). 
Decision Table, MLP, and Decision Tree classifiers are applied in 
first stage and their results are combined with different schemes as 
mentioned above. 
(a)   Average of probabilities 
        It takes an average of the probabilities of each class from the 
individual classifiers (k=3 for three classifiers) and compares which 
class has greater probability such that, 
;<,
3
1=
3
1=
benign
k
avgmalware
k
avg ClassPClassPifMalware                   (3.9) 
.>,
3
1=
3
1=
benign
k
avgmalware
k
avg ClassPClassPifBenign 
            
(3.10) 
(b)   Product of probabilities 
     Product of probabilities is taken from each of the classifiers and 
highest probability of class is assigned as: 
;<,
3
1=
3
1=
benign
k
avgmalware
k
avg ClassPClassPifMalware                 (3.11) 
.>,
3
1=
3
1=
benign
k
avgmalware
k
avg ClassPClassPifBenign                   (3.12) 
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 (c)   Majority vote 
     The final result is decided based on the results obtained from the 
majority of the results.  Results of ensemble classification are 
depicted in Tables 4.9 to 4.11. The product of probabilities method 
yields the best results. 
 
Figure 4.5: Stacking Process  
4.6.5 Results of Ensemble methods 
Ensemble methods are applied on different datasets and a 
considerable amount of improvement is noticed in the performance of 
model. Following four cases are particularly noticeable due to their distinct 
nature. 
(i) The worst model with SMO with an accuracy of 67% 
improved to an accuracy of 94.6% after applying stacking method 
(Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9: Accuracy gain in SMO model with Stacking 
 
Dataset 
 
Meta. 
AAdaBoo  
 
Meta. 
Bagging 
 
Meta. 
Stacking 
 
Classification  
67.84 
 
63.12 
 
94.6 
 
(ii)  The minimum accuracy obtained with Decision table without 
ensemble methods was 99.3% which increased to 99.5 with 
bagging method (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10:  Accuracy gain in Decision Table model with 
Bagging 
 
Dataset 
 
Meta. 
AAdaBoo  
 
Meta. 
Bagging 
 
Meta. 
Stacking 
 
Classification  
99.3 
 
99.51 
 
99.38 
(iii)  The minimum accuracy obtained with Naïve Bayesian before 
applying ensemble methods was 98.2% which improved to 99% 
with stacking and 98.31% with boosting method (Table 4.11). 
Table 4.11: Accuracy gain in Naïve Bayesian model with Boosting and 
Stacking 
 
Dataset 
 
Meta. 
AAdaBoo  
 
Meta. 
Bagging 
 
Meta. 
Stacking 
 
Classification  
98.35 
 
98.31 
 
99 
Ensemble methods combine results from multiple machine learning 
algorithms to improve the predictive performance [159]. It is not necessary 
that the performance of ensemble learning be better than the individual 
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classifiers. The stacked performance depends on the selection of 
classifiers and methods used to combine the output predictions [160]. 
We apply three ensemble methods: Boosting, bagging, and 
stacking to further improve the detection accuracy. Stacking gives the 
better results as compared to boosting and bagging.  
4.7 Summary  
Android security model relies on permission and intent based 
mechanisms for controlling access to vital hardware and software 
components. However, so far these two features have not been combined 
together for detection of malware.  
 
In this chapter, Android permissions and intents are investigated for 
using them to detect the malware apps. We also investigated the 
correlation between permissions and intents by applying statistical testing 
methods. It was also studied how effective is to combine permissions and 
intents analysis for malware detection.  Permissions and intents are found 
to be most effective features of Android for characterizing malware as they 
are easy to extract from the manifest files of apps and require less 
processing time and complexity. This work proposed a novel malware 
detection method―PInDroid which is based on these two key features. 
Various well known classification algorithms were applied on the dataset. 
Application of classification algorithms have given very encouraging 
results to further advance the work. 
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In this chapter, we also applied different ensemble methods such as 
Boosting, Bagging and stacking on six well Machine Learning classifiers: 
Naïve Bayesian, Decision Table, Decision Tree, Neural Network (MLP), 
SMO and Random Forest. All the classifiers demonstrated an increase in 
performance at different ensemble methods. Accuracy of some of the 
classifiers improved with bagging method and some of them improved with 
stacking method. These methods have improved the overall results 
significantly thus increasing the confidence level. 
It was observed during repeating the experiments that it is not 
necessary to get good or equal results with different ensemble methods. 
Results of ensemble learning depend on the classifier itself and the 
combination of classifiers chosen for cascading stages.  
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Detection of Colluding Applications  
5.1 Introduction 
Android being the most popular platform for mobile devices is under 
proliferated malicious attacks. A recent threat is from app collusion; in 
which two or more apps collaborate to perform stealthy malicious 
operations by elevating their permission landscape using legitimate 
communication channels. Each app requests for a limited set of 
permissions which do not seem dangerous to users. However, when 
combined, these permissions potentially inflict a number of malicious 
attacks. Mobile users are generally unaware of this type of permission 
augmentation, they consider each app separately. Hence, their decision to 
install apps is limited in perspective due to unawareness of such type of 
capability escalation [164].  
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Android implements sandbox and permission based access control 
to protect resources and sensitive data, however, being open source and 
developer-friendly architecture, it facilitates sharing of functionalities 
across multiple apps. It supports useful collaboration among apps for the 
purpose of resource sharing; however, it also introduces the risk of app 
collusion when the collaboration is done with malicious intention. Cyber 
criminals exploit this vulnerability to launch distributed malicious attacks 
[165].  
This chapter investigates Android application collusion and intents 
related attacks with an intention to furnish a feasibility study of using our 
permissions and intents based methodology for detection of malicious 
colluding apps. Most of the recent works on app collusion investigate 
permissions and IPC mechanism to understand their role in app collusion.  
Our preliminary investigations confirm that permissions and intents can be 
exploited to detect malicious app collusion.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents 
an overview of app collusion, Section 5.3 investigates the technical details 
of app collusion and covert channels, and Section 5.4 presents the IPC 
and intents related attacks. Section 5.5statistical testing details carried out 
to understand the correlation between permissions and intents. Section 
3.5 presents the challenges faced in detecting app collusion and 
recommend potential measures. Section 5.7 proposes a possible generic 
framework for detection of colluding apps and finally Section 5.8 
summarizes the chapter.  
113 
 
5.2 Overview 
Application collusion is possible with Inter Process Communication 
(IPC), covert channels or system vulnerabilities. Malicious colluding apps 
are explicitly designed by cyber criminals by using different tactics which 
includes the development of apps with same User ID. Such apps have 
more chances for a successful collusion attack. In some cases, mis-
configured apps also participate in the collusion attack with a complete 
obliviousness of colluding app [166]. One of the collusion scenarios is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1: App 'A' has no permission to access the internet; 
however it has permissions for camera. Similarly, App 'B' has no 
permission for the camera but can access the internet. Assuming that the 
components of both apps are not protected by any access permission, 
they could collude to capture the pictures and upload on a remote server 
through the Internet. 
 
Figure 5.1:  Application Collusion Scenario 
114 
 
Until recently, a small scale research is done on app collusion 
primarily due to non-availability of known samples of colluding apps for 
analysis and experimentations [167]. Most of the works accentuated on 
rummaging of covert channels and development of experimental colluding 
apps. As a result of this innovative approach, the research on collusion 
gained a little momentum and there are now a few collusion detection 
approaches available each with a limited scope. Despite the growing 
research interest, detection of malicious colluding apps has been a 
challenging task [168]. 
The fact that permissions and intents (which are the key features of 
our detection model) are the main features behind the application 
collusion, our proposed malware detection model is particularly suitable for 
detection of colluding applications in addition to other types of malware 
applications.  
In Android, all applications are treated as potentially malicious. 
They are isolated from each other and do not have access to each other’s' 
private data. Each app runs in its own process and by default can only 
access own files. This isolation is enforced with the sandbox, in which 
each app is assigned with a unique user identifier (UID) and own Virtual 
Machine (VM). App developers are required to sign the apps with a self-
certified key. Apps signed with the same key can share UIDs and ca n be 
placed in a same sandbox [169]. 
Android app comes as .apk file, which contains the byte code, data, 
resources, libraries and a manifest file. Manifest fi le declares the 
115 
 
permissions, intents, features and components of an app. The 
components that can be handled by an app are declared with intent filters. 
System resources and user data are protected through permissions. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the communication between apps in a sandbox 
environment. App 1 can use only those system resources and user data 
for which it has permissions. Similarly, app 2 is also limited to use certain 
resources. Although both apps have limited permissions to access the 
resources but through IPC, they are able to augment their permissions and 
get over-privileged access to system resources and user data. 
 
Figure 5.2  Inter Process Communication 
 
5.3  Investigations of Application Collusion  
Colluding applications are those applications that cooperate in 
some manner to perform extended operations which they would 
independently be unable due to their respective permission restrictions. 
These applications can perform covert operations even without breaking 
the security framework or exploiting any system vulnerabilities [170]. 
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Application collusion can inflict serious damages to the user by stealing 
user’s data or device resources.  Following elements of Android 
architecture directly or indirectly contribute in app collusion:- 
 Permissions 
Permissions are used to restrict the access of system resources 
and user data on the device.  
    Shared User ID 
 Android assigns a unique user ID to each app to ensure that it 
runs in its own process and can only access the allocated system 
resources. Apps with shared User IDs (shared Userid) can access 
each other's data and can run in same process, thereby limiting the 
effectiveness of isolation provided with user ID. 
 
 Components 
 
 Components are the basic modules that are run by apps or the 
system. There are four types of components: Activities, Services, 
Content Providers and Broadcast Receivers.  
 Intents  
Intents are messages used to communicate between the 
components of apps. These messages are used to request actions or 
services from other application components. Intents declare the 
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intention to perform an operation [166]. Intents are of two types: 
Explicit and Implicit. Explicit intent specifies the component 
exclusively by class name. Implicit intent does not specify a particular 
component by name. Apps with implicit intent only specify the 
required action without specifying particular apps or component. 
System selects the app from device which can perform the requisite 
task. Implicit intents are vulnerable to exploits as they can combine 
operations of various applications, if they are not handled properly. 
 Sandboxing  
Sandboxing isolates an app from other apps and system 
resources. Each app has a unique identifier and has access to the 
allocated System files and resources against the unique identifier. An 
app can also access fi les of other apps that are declared as 
readable/writeable/executable for others. 
 Access Control Mechanism 
  In Android, the access control mechanism of Linux prevails. It 
controls access to files by process ownership. Each running 
process is assigned a UserID and for each file, access rules are 
specified. File access rules are defined for a user, group and 
everyone, thus granting permissions to read / write / execute the 
file. 
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 Application Signing  
Cryptographic signatures are used for verification of app source 
and for establishing trust among apps. Developers are required to 
sign the app to enable signature based permissions, and to allow 
apps from the same developer to share the UserID. A self-signed 
certificate of the signing key is enclosed into the app installation 
package for validation at installation time. 
5.3.1      Covert Communication Channels 
A covert channel is a stealthy mechanism which exploits 
resources and uses them to exchange information between apps in a 
manner that it cannot be detected [171]. There are two types of covert 
channels: Timing and Storage. Timing channels modulate the time spent 
on execution of some task or using some resource. Storage channels 
relate to modifying the data item such as configuration changes etc. 
Example of covert channel is sending user data to a remote server by 
encoding it as network delays over the normal network traffic [172]. Figure 
5.3 depicts a covert channel, where a file of 20 bytes containing some data 
is sent through a normal communication channel. The file size is covert 
information. This information might not be of any importance to the 
receiver but significantly valuable for the malicious party. 
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Figure 5.3: Overt and covert channel 
Covert channel typically exploit the shared resources to read, 
store and modify data as a medium for communication between two 
malicious entities. This type of information exchange is different from IPC 
based resource sharing. App collusion through covert channels is 
investigated by implementing high throughput covert channels in [165]. 
5.4  IPC related Attacks 
Android security builds upon sandbox, application signing and 
permission mechanism. However, these protections fail if the resource and 
task sharing procedures provided through IPC are used with malicious 
intentions. In this section, we discuss most common IPC related attacks on 
Android devices. 
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5.4.1  Application Collusion Attack 
In application collusion attack, two or more apps collude to 
perform a malicious operation which is broken into small actions [165]. 
Each of the participating apps communicates using legitimate 
communication channels to perform the part assigned to them. Apps do 
not need to break any security framework or exploit the system 
vulnerabilities for carrying out a collaborative operation [168]. Colluding 
attack help in malware evasion as the current commercially available anti -
malware solutions do not have capability of simultaneously analyzing 
multiple apps to detect collusion. 
5.4.2  Privilege Escalation Attack 
In privilege escalation attack, an application with less 
permissions access components of more privileged application [172].This 
attack is prevalent in misconfigured apps mainly from the third party 
market. The default device applications of phone, clock and settings were 
also vulnerable to this attack [173]. Confused deputy attack is a type of 
privilege escalation attack. A compromised deputy may potentially transmit 
the sensitive data to the destination specified in the spoofed intent (Fig. 
5.4). Consider an app which is processing some sensitive information like 
bank details at the time of receipt of spoofed intent. It is likely that such 
information may be passed on to the url or phone number defined in the 
malicious intent. 
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Figure 5.4: Confused Deputy Attack 
5.4.3  Intents related Attacks 
Explicit and implicit intents may potentially assist in colluding 
attacks. Although, explicit intents guarantee the success of collusion 
between apps, implicit intents can also be intercepted by the malicious 
apps with matching intent filters. We discuss some of the known intents 
related attacks. 
 Broadcast Theft 
A public broadcast sent by application is vulnerable to 
interception. As shown in Figure 5.5, a malicious app 'M' can 
passively listen to the public broadcasts while the actual recipient is 
also listening. If a malicious receiver registers itself as a high priority 
receiver in ordered broadcasts and receives the broadcast first, it 
could stop the further broadcasting to the recipients. The ordered 
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broadcasts are serially delivered messages to the recipients that 
follow an order according to the priority of receivers. Public and 
ordered broadcasts may cause eavesdropping and Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks [167]. 
 
Figure 5.5: Broadcast Theft Attack 
      Activity Hijacking  
If a malicious app registers to receive the implicit intent, it may 
launch activity hijacking attack on successful interception of intent. 
With activity hijacking, a malicious activity can illegally read the data 
of the intent before relaying it to the recipient [165]. It can also 
launch some malicious activity instead of the actual one. Consider a 
scenario, in which an activity is required to notify the user for the 
completion of certain action. The malicious user can falsely notify 
the user for the completion of uncompleted activity like un-
installation of app or transaction completed. 
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 Service Hijacking 
  If an exported service is not protected with permissions, it can 
be intercepted by an illegitimate service, which may connect the 
requesting app with a malicious service instead of the actual one [5]. 
In this attack, the malicious user hijacks the implicit intent which 
contains the details of service and start the malicious service in place 
of the expected one. Implicit intents are not guaranteed to reach to 
the desired recipient because it does not exclusively specify the 
recipient. A malicious app can intercept an un-protected intent and 
access its data by declaring a matching intent filter [6]. This type of 
attack may be used for Phishing, Denial of Service (DoS) and 
component hijacking attacks are possible with unauthorized intent 
receipt. 
 
 Intent Spoofing 
 In Intent spoofing attack, the malicious app controls the 
unprotected public component of a vulnerable app. It starts 
performing as the deputy of the controlling app and carries out the 
malicious activity on behalf of the controlling app [3]. This type of 
attack is also known as confused deputy attack as the deputies 
(victim apps) are unaware of their participation in the malicious 
activities. Figure 5.4 illustrates the confused deputy attack. A 
malicious broadcast injection is also possible with spoofed intent 
when a broadcast receiver that is registered to receive the system 
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broadcasts trusts an incoming malicious broadcast as a legitimate 
one and performs those actions which need system triggers. 
5.5  Detection of colluding applications 
Detection of app collusion is a very complex proposition. There 
are a number of challenges in designing a solution to detect the malicious 
colluding apps and there remain big question marks over efficacy of such 
solutions. This is the prime reason that we don't have a lot of reliable 
choices available for such detections. 
5.5.1  Challenges 
First challenge in detection is classification of IPC into benign 
and malicious groups. Android is an open source platform, which 
encourages resource sharing among apps by re-using the components. 
IPC is mainly used by apps to interact with different inter and intra 
components. The main problem is to distinguish between the benign 
collaboration and malicious collusion. Such a distinction is likely to come 
up with a cost of very high false positives. Keeping the false positive rate 
to lowest is another problem.  
Secondly, considering the substantial number of apps available 
in the Android market (more than 2 Million apps by Feb 2016), there is a 
difficulty of analyzing pairs of apps. It is computationally challenging and 
cost exorbitant to analyze all possible pairs of apps to detect the malicious 
collusion between sets of apps given the search space. Analysis of all 
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possible app pairs of total of N apps would require N2 pairs. Similarly, to 
analyze sets of three colluding apps, it would require analyzing N3 apps. 
An effective collusion detection tool must be capable of isolating potential 
sets of apps and carrying out further investigations. 
 Another glaring challenge is the presence of a number of 
covert channels in the system. Detection of covert channels is an NP-hard 
problem as it would require monitoring of all the possible communication 
channels [174]. Covert channels are difficult to detect because they use 
overt channels for conveying stealthy information. Lastly, known malicious 
colluding apps are not available for analysis. The non-availability of known 
samples of colluding apps, makes it difficult to validate the experiment 
results. Analysis and validation of collusion detection is a quandary, we 
need known samples of colluding apps to validate the detection method, 
but to  find the samples, a reliable detection method is mandatory, which 
itself is not available in an authenticated form. 
An effective collusion detection system must overcome the 
aforementioned challenges and encompasses an integrated solution. The 
detection of IPC based collusion have been recently proposed in a few 
research papers [175], [176], [177], and [178]. The proposed approaches 
have a number of limitations and the accuracy and efficiency of these 
methods is questionable due to non-availability of universally accepted 
dataset of malware colluding apps. 
The solution proposed in [174] is to re-design the security 
model of Android system to mitigate the risk of collusion. However, this 
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would involve a big cost and complexity in re-writing the OS components 
and ensuring their compatibility and smooth functioning in conjunction with 
already available millions of apps in the Android market. 
Another approach [175] is limited to the detection of collusion 
based on intents only. It analyzes the interaction of components through 
intent filters only and analyzes only two apps at a time. Currently, this 
approach suffers with a high false positive rate. It is a memory consuming 
approach which may not be feasible for mobile phones keeping in view the 
limited memory of phones. It is likelihood that extensive memory 
consumption may deteriorate the overall performance of device. Similarly, 
[176] is also mainly based on intent messages. This approach faces the 
challenges of conventional rule based methods that are prone to evasion 
with obfuscation and evasion. Scalability is a major drawback of their 
approach. 
Malware collusion detection tool [177] supports the latest API 
versions only, hence analysis of apps developed under earlier versions is 
not possible. Technical details of the tool are not available for performance 
verifications and evaluations. It generates a high number of false alarms 
mainly due to its reliance over information flows. 
The detection of covert channels is still an under explored 
research area. So far, there are two works [173] [178], which attempts to 
detect the covert channels based app collusion. Currently, [173] has a 
limited scope of detecting only covert channels related to shared 
resources such as reading of the voice volume, change of the screen state 
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and change of vibration settings etc. However, the approach can be 
investigated for inclusion of other covert channels. Similarly, [178] handles 
only data flows. 
5.5.2 Potential Measures 
The complexity and challenges of collusion detection merit a hybrid 
framework. As a result of our analysis, we recommend an integrated 
approach for detection of app collusion. We also suggest that a covert 
channel may not be detected in isolation, but its existence may be realized 
whilst analyzing the IPC related security breaches. We argue that any 
mobile user downloads a limited number of apps as opposed to available 
millions of apps. A user cannot install millions of apps on a single device; 
hence, there is no need to analyze the millions of app pairs or triplets for 
possible collusion. On the average, a mobile user installs 20 to 30 apps. A 
system capable of analyzing 502 or 503 apps is sufficient for a common 
mobile user. This solution may also be augmented with a cloud based 
analysis engine if the number of concurrently analyzed apps is increased 
to 4, 5 or more. Cloud based analysis is an efficient and cost effective 
approach for high computational operations. We argue that adopting such 
an approach is essentially required to facilitate the identification of sets of 
colluding apps from a dataset of millions of apps. 
Since permissions and intents facilitate inter and intra app 
communication and collaboration. Analysis of usage pattern of 
permissions and intents has potentials to detect app collusion through IPC 
and covert channels. Adding shared user IDs and publicly declared intents 
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is also recommended as the collaborating apps may use same User IDs to 
make sure that the attack is successful. 
5.6 Proposed framework for Detection of Colluding Apps 
There are different methods with which applications can collude; 
however shared user ID and public declaration of intent are two key 
features of Android OS which are more vulnerable to collusion attacks.  
(a) Shared User ID 
 In the UID assignment step, sharing UID is checked in the 
manifest. If the sharing UID exists, Android checks other 
applications' share User Id. If they match to each other, this 
application is assigned with the existing UID. If no applications 
match or no sharing UID in the manifest, a new UID is assigned to 
this application. In the permission assignment step, if the UID is 
new, this UID will have all permissions requested in the manifest if 
the users approve. If the UID is shared, this application will not only 
have its own requested permissions, but also the permissions of 
other applications with the same UID. 
Application sandbox is a means to isolate the applications from 
each other in the Android system by assigning a UID and a set of 
permissions [179]. When the application is installed on the device, it 
runs in its own sandbox and other applications cannot access or 
interfere. An application can only access its own files, unless other 
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applications explicitly assign the access permissions to this 
application. For example, if the applications are created by the 
same developers, the developers can make these applications 
share the same UID, then these applications will run in the same 
sandbox and share the resources in that sandbox. 
Application signing is used to ensure the application security. 
It creates a certification between developers and their applications. 
Before placing an application into its sandbox, the application 
signing creates a relationship between the UID and the application. 
The applications couldn't be run on the Android without signing. 
With the same UID, that is, running in the same sandbox, the 
applications can share the permissions and communicate with each 
other. By using application signing, the application update process 
can be simplified. Since different versions of the same application 
have the same certificate, the package manager can verify this 
certificate. Then, the old version is replaced; the new version can 
have the permissions already granted to the old version. What's 
more, the application signing can also ensure that an application 
cannot communicate with another app unless using the ICC. But if 
the author is the same, the author can use the same application 
signing to enable the direct communication among his/her 
applications. 
Android OS assigns a unique user id to each application to 
ensure that it is run in its own process and resources created 
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against that id. However, aapplications can share their user ids if 
they are developed with same signature or certificate and 
applications with the same user ids (shared Userid) can access 
each other's data and can be run in the same process.Shared 
UserIds are declared in application’s Manifest file as shown in 
Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.6:  Declaration of Shared User ID in Manifest file. 
(b) Implicit Intent declaration 
Implicit intents specify the action it needs to perform without 
specifying particular apps/component which can only be used for that 
action. Implicit intents are vulnerable to exploits as they can combine 
operations of various applications, if they are not handled 
appropriately. Applications can receive implicit intents from other 
apps if they advertise/declare their components with an intent filter. If 
the declared intent filter of app matches all the fields of requesting 
intent then system will pass on the implicit intent the declaring app. 
Intrinsic intents are declared in the manifest file as depicted in Fig. 
5.7. 
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Figure 5.7:. Declaration of Public Intrinsic Intent. 
Adding these two key features in our detection model enables the 
further classification of malware apps as colluding apps or vice versa.  
This can be realized with an additional layer of classifier or through adding 
few lines into the code. Figure 30 depicts the additional layer for the 
detection of colluding apps.  
The proposed system is shown in Figure 5.8. In first stage, apps are 
analyzed to identify those which share user IDs as they have more 
potential to collude successfully. In second stage, permissions and intents 
are extracted and analyzed for source permission, source intent, sink 
permission and sink intent. Pairwise communication mappings of apps are 
generated from the source and sink permissions and intents. The identified 
communicating pairs of apps are further analyzed to check if their 
communication is limited to each other or more apps. The classifier stage 
is used to classify the app into colluding or non-colluding ones and users 
are notified for possible collusion. In the proposed approach, permissions 
and intents are grouped into four categories: source permissions, source 
intents, sink permissions and sink intents. Source permissions or intents 
are those that initiate some operation, whereas the sink permissions and 
intents are those which act upon to complete the required operation [164]. 
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With additional policy refinements, the identified colluding apps can be 
classified into benign and malicious apps. This approach may be 
integrated with the methodologies proposed in [178] and [173] to monitor 
the data flow sources and sinks of IPC and tracking of shared resources. 
Information flow system proposed in [178] to monitor the data flow sources 
and sinks in IPC is a good trade-off for detecting the covert channels 
however, it lacks the tracking of shared resources. Mapping structure of 
[173] helps in tracking the shared resources used by two interacting apps. 
 
Figure 5.8: Collusion Detection Model 
Effective detection of app collusion requires monitoring of IPC and all 
possible covert communication channels: shared resources and data flow 
sources and sinks. An integrated system comprising of the proposed 
framework and Taintdroid [178] for analyzing the covert channels is a good 
starter towards a comprehensive detection system. 
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5.7 Related Work 
IPC and intents have not been explored the way permissions have 
been investigated. Most of the existing IPC based studies focus on finding 
the IPC related vulnerabilities. [179] investigated the IPC framework and 
interaction of system components. [166] detects the IPC related 
vulnerabilities. [180] suggested improvement in ComDroid by segregating 
the communication messages into inter and intra-applications groups so 
that the risk of inter-application attacks may be reduced. [181] 
characterized Android components and their interaction. They investigated 
risks associated with misconfigured intents. [182] examined vulnerable 
public component interfaces of apps. [183] generated test scenarios to 
demonstrate the ICC vulnerabilities. [184] performs information flow 
analysis to investigate the communication exploits. [185] investigated 
intents related vulnerabilities and demonstrated how they may be exploited 
to insert the malicious data. Their experiments found 29 out of a total of 64 
investigated apps as vulnerable to intent related attacks. Similarly, [186] 
investigated the ICC vulnerabilities. All of these works focus on finding 
communication vulnerabilities, and none of them used IPC and intents for 
malware detection. 
5.8 Summary 
The concept of colluding apps has emerged recently. App collusion 
can cause irrevocable damage to mobile users. Detection of colluding 
apps is quite a challenging task. Some of the challenges are: distinction 
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between the benign and malicious collaboration, false positive rate, 
presence of covert channels and concurrent analysis of millions of apps. 
Existing malware detection system is designed to analyse each app in 
isolation. There is no commercially available detection system which can 
analyse multiple apps concurrently to detect the collusion. We have 
carried out a preliminary study to evaluate the applicability of our proposed 
approach for detection of collaborating apps.  
In this chapter, we discussed the current state and open challenges 
to detection of colluding apps. To address the problem, we have proposed 
an integrated approach to detect app collusion. However, due to non-
availability of real colluding app samples, it was not possible to validate the 
framework. The complexity of problem merits collaborative large scale 
investigations to mitigate a very large number of known and unknown 
communication channels between apps besides known IPC and covert 
channels. Our future work aims to validate the proposed framework on real 
colluding apps. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future work 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the author’s work by revisiting the thesis 
goals, contributions and achieved objectives. This includes the author’s 
work: PInDroid, the permissions and intents based solution that can detect 
malicious apps accurately and efficiently.  
This work also validates different well known classification and 
clustering algorithms for comparing their performance in malware 
detection. We found that classification algorithms are more accurate as 
compared to clustering algorithms for malware detection. 
Different ensemble methods are also applied on the models to 
ascertain the margin of performance improvement. Detection accuracy of 
proposed model is further optimized with boosting, bagging and blending 
methods. 
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The author also demonstrated the usefulness of PInDroid 
methodology by implementing it through an automated malware detection 
algorithm: AndroPIn.  
The author also described two additional studies, which 
investigated the usefulness of the proposed methodology to detect the 
malicious colluding apps and obfuscated malware apps.   
Lastly, the author discusses possible future directions of research 
based on top of research performed by the author after systematically 
reviewing the work related to Android malware. 
6.2  Restating Research Problems and Research Goals 
In Chapter 2, the author performed an extensive survey on the 
existing work related to the analysis, detection, and classification of 
Android malware to identify the research gaps. This resulted in four thesis 
goals discussed below: 
Goal 1 outlined the importance of analysing the features extractable 
from the manifest file such as permissions and intents as they are widely 
used by apps to perform basic operations and can help in understanding 
the behaviours of malicious apps. As these features do not need run-time 
analysis, the static approach is used for efficiency purpose. 
Goal 2 outlines the use of best classifier for achieving the best 
accuracy. The selection of the classification algorithm is done after 
comparing different algorithms against globally accepted performance 
metrics. 
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While highly detailed data tends towards higher accuracy, 
excessive or redundant data increases performance costs and decreases 
the efficiency of a framework. Thus, we introduced Goal 3, which 
influenced a smaller, more concentrated, set of features to work with. This 
allowed the author to improve accuracy with less performance sacrifices, a 
trade-off issue common when dealing with large datasets. 
Lastly, despite of efficient and accurate framework, it is ineffective if 
malware can evade analysis or detection. We discovered this to be a 
problem with several frameworks, as they were vulnerable to obfuscation 
and evasion. Thus, we introduced Goal 4 to develop frameworks that were 
resilient to code obfuscation. 
6.3  Research Contributions  
In the introduction chapter, the author stated the contributions of 
this work and the novel research aspect of each contribution. In this 
section, we elaborate on the contributions of this work.  
6.3.1 Android Malware Detection:  PInDroid 
In Chapter 4, we proposed PInDroid, a permissions and intents 
based methodology to distinguish between malicious and benign apps. 
Android security model relies on permission and intent mechanisms for 
controlling access to vital hardware and software components. However, 
these features were never used jointly to investigate their effectiveness in 
the malware detection. This work is the first one that proposes a novel 
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malware detection method based on these two vital security features.  
The basic work of investigations on the identified features: 
permissions and intents were completed in chapter 3, which resulted in 
identification of the usage patterns of permissions and intents by malware 
and benign apps. The author’s role in identifying the effective 
combinations of permissions and intents and automatically performing 
extraction has been instrumental. This resulted in novel, efficient and 
accurate permissions and intents based Android malware detection 
solution. The resulting model fulfilled the author’s goals of a robust, 
efficient, and accurate analysis solution.  
6.3.2   Malware Classification using suitable ML Classifier 
Different well known classification and clustering algorithms were 
investigated for comparing their performance in malware detection. We 
found classification algorithms more efficient and useful as compared to 
clustering algorithms for malware detection.   
Using the author’s work in PInDroid, the author then provided a 
novel feature set to feed to six ML classifiers. Performance of classifiers 
was then compared in terms of false positive rate, true positive rate, 
precision, recall, and accuracy. In order to further optimize the 
classification results, different ensemble methods were also applied to 
ascertain the margin of performance improvement. It was ascertained 
through experiments that the performance of PInDroid can further be 
increased with boosting, bagging and blending ensemble methods.  
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6.3.3 Implementation of Methodology through an Algorithm: 
AndroPIn 
The author also implemented the proposed approach in form of an 
algorithm to automatically detect the malware. The algorithm: AndroPIn is 
implementable as either a client end or a cloud based solution. The 
algorithm finds dangerous permissions and dangerous intents in the 
malware app and verifies against the malicious threshold. 
6.3.4 Investigation for Detection of Obfuscated and Colluding apps 
The last segment of work in this thesis comprises of two studies. 
First study investigated the effectiveness of the proposed approach of 
PInDroid for detection of obfuscated malicious apps and the second study 
explored if the approach can be used for detection of colluding apps.  We 
investigated the techniques used by apps for possible collusion and found 
that permission model and Intent are the basic essence of collusion. This 
fact strengthens our approach for possible detection of collusion apps. The 
ancillary work shows that the permissions and intents based solution can 
be used to detect the colluding apps. Furthermore, the work shows 
possible applications for detection of obfuscated malware, which are 
difficult to detect with other solutions. 
6.4   Future Work 
There are many directions to advance the work that has been 
presented in this thesis. First of all, as a future work, we aim to validate our 
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PInDroid approach on more malware and benign samples to evaluate its 
performance on diversified malware families and benign categories. 
The second area for future work is to implement the methodology 
for detection of colluding apps. It can be integrated with other state-of-the-
art solutions as discussed in chapter 5 and to validate the integrated 
solution on real colluding apps.  
Another possible future work could be to determine whether there 
are better machine learning methods than the ones used in this approach. 
Many available machine learning and deep learning approaches have not 
yet been tested for the most appropriate method.  
Similarly, multi-class classification would be an interesting area of 
work. Applications can be classified into three categories: malware, benign 
and greyware thereby giving mobile users more flexibility to draw the 
peripheries between the applications. 
AndroPIn implementation can be improved for better performance. 
More samples need to be tested to validate the algorithm. Malicious 
scoring of malware apps is another area which can further improve and 
widen the malware detection.  
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6.5     Concluding Remarks 
Android, and Android malware are rapidly evolving as of the year 
2017. Therefore, it is imperative to continue the research on emerging 
malware threats and their mitigation solutions. In this thesis, a 
comprehensive survey on the existing work on Android malware detection 
and classification is presented and research gaps have been identified. 
The culmination of these observations lead to a novel malware detection 
approach: PInDroid, which efficiently and accurately detect most of the 
malware from permissions and intents analysis. The approach is 
implemented as an algorithm: AndroPIn to automatically detect the 
malware.  The permissions and intents based system has potential to 
detect the malicious colluding apps besides the obfuscated malware apps.    
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